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John Fenzel is the author of the novel, The Lazarus Covenant. Learn more at: www.JohnFenzel.com
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The Most Dangerous Two Weeks in History...
In the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union dispatched a fleet of commercial cargo ships filled with nuclear missiles, launchers and anti-aircraft guns--all under false manifests--across the Atlantic Ocean to Fidel Castro's Cuba. Forty thousand Soviet soldiers and technicians began clandestinely erecting an extensive array of armed missile sites, and aiming their nuclear-tipped medium range ballistic missiles at the United States. Nikita Khruschev and his key military advisors thought that the missiles would remain unnoticed until November, and then he planned to suddenly reveal them to the United States as a fait accompli. They were nearly successful. But in mid-October, with the Soviet tankers still enroute, American U-2 spy planes and CIA photo analysts detected several Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) on Cuban soil, their sites still under construction. In the weeks that followed, both nations stood at the brink of nuclear holocaust. Never before in history has the world come closer to a general nuclear war. On this 46th Anniversary of those events, understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis today is arguably more important than it has ever been.
Squidoo's Lens of the Year for 2007!
Squidoo named Thirteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis Lens of the Year for 2007!Many thanks to all who voted for this lens!
Several years ago, I had the opportunity to sit down over dinner with Ted Sorenson, one of President Kennedy's closest advisors. We discussed the Cuban Missile Crisis at length and it was obvious to me as we spoke, that this singular event had a profound and enduring effect on him--to this day. This seminal event in our nation's history continues to be studied at all of our nation's war colleges. Those discussions, public and private, prompted me to craft this lens.
I'm honored to have Thirteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis named Lens of the Year. And I'm humbled--there are so many supremely talented lensmasters with superb lenses on Squidoo. And so, for me, it's a great privilege to be a part of the Squidoo community!
Pre-Crisis Timeline
1960-1962 (The roots of the crisis began two years prior).
July 9, 1960: Khruschev declares that "speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with rocket fire."
July 12, 1960:
Khruschev declares the Monroe Doctrine "dead."
October 19, 1960:
The U.S. ends all exports to Cuba except nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies.
April 17-19, 1961:
CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion fails.
June 3-4, 1961:
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev meet in Vienna.
February 3, 1962:
President Kennedy embargoes all trade with Cuba except for medical necessities.
May 24, 1962:
The Soviet Defense Ministry formally decides to send nuclear missiles to Cuba.
Throughout the summer of 1962:
U.S. Surveillance of heavy volume of Russian shipping bound for Cuba. Emerging picture of the military build-up worries John A. McCone, DCI. He increases U-2 overflights, concerned that the Soviets might introduce offensive weapons into Cuba. The first photographic proof of surface-to-air missile deployments in Cuba was obtained on August 29, 1962. Also confirms seven KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats in the naval port of Mariel, twenty-seven miles west-southwest of Havana. Reveals a cruise-missile launch site that could be launched against invading forces.
August 31, 1962:
Republican Senator Kenneth Keating warns of possible Soviet "Rocket installations in Cuba" and urges President Kennedy to act. This sentiment echoes in Congress through the first three weeks of October.
September 4:
President Kennedy issues a press statement that denies evidence of offensive military weapons in Cuba but warns, "Were it otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."
September 13:
At a press conference, President Kennedy declares that if Cuba were to "become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."
September 20:
The Senate resolves by a vote of 86 to 1 to sanction the use of force, if necessary, "to prevent the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military capability endangering the security of the U.S." Six days later the House of Representatives passes this resolution by a vote of 384 to 7.
Soviet Ships Carrying Offensive Armaments to Cuba
September 28, 1962
The Threat
Why the Crisis?
The SS-4 Sandal MRBM could launch a three-megaton warhead to an estimated range of 1,020 nautical miles that could reach targets as far away as Washington, D.C., Dallas, or the Panama Canal. CIA reference photograph of Soviet medium-range ballistic missile in Red Square, Moscow.
(SS-4 in U.S. documents, R-12 in Soviet documents)
CIA briefing board for JFK showing range of Soviet MRBMs
Bobby Kennedy on 16 October jokingly asked whether the missiles could hit Oxford, Mississippi, where federal marshals had intervened only two weeks earlier, so Oxford was included.
The Miscalculations
Kennedy had decided--and publicly announced--that the Soviets would never deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba. Given the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev had decided that the United States would certainly acquiesce in their deployment. The Political Risk
The missiles emplaced in Cuba endanger all U.S. foreign policy because the presence, left unchallenged, would effectively signal the Kremlin, Western allies, wavering neutrals, and the American people that the president would not uphold publicly stated vital interests to a threat at the country's "doorstep." There was also a domestic risk--President Kennedy was acutely aware of his administration's failed Bay of Pigs invasion and how it was playing out at home. Especially after his previous public pronouncements that the United States would never accept nuclear missiles in Cuba, giving in to Soviet demands now, with an election not far away, Kennedy knew, could be politically fatal. U.S. Navy low-level photograph of San Cristobal MRBM site No. 1
October 23, 1962
The Players
Cuba:Fidel Castro. Castro doesn't agree with the Soviet argument that Cuba needs nuclear missiles to defend itself. He would be satisfied with a formal alliance or a few Soviet brigades that could act as a trip wire to engage the Soviets in any war with the United States. From the outset, Castro feels strongly that harboring Soviet missiles might compromise his reputation for independence and tarnish his revolutionary image in Latin America. He nonetheless readily accepts Khrushchev's plan, with the idea that it will reinforce the position of the entire communist bloc. Fidel says he's glad to be of service to the world communist cause.
The Soviet Union:
Premier Nikita Khrushchev (68 years old)
Anatoly Dobrynin: Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Andrei Gromyko: Soviet Foreign Minister
Valerian A. Zorin: Head of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations.

The United States:
Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the National Security Council and the president. Received all source intelligence reports and recommended options for various courses of action to the president.
President Kennedy (45 years old)
Robert Kennedy: Attorney General
Lyndon Johnson: Vice President
Roswell Gilpatrick: Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Maxwell Taylor: CJCS
John A. McCone: DCI
McGeorge Bundy: National Security Assistant to the President
Robert McNamara: Secretary of Defense
Dean Rusk: Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson: Under Secretary of State
Douglas Dillon: Secretary of Treasury
George Ball: Deputy Secretary of State
Ted Sorenson: Chief Domestic Policy Advisor to the President
Adlai Stevenson: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Experts Brought in to the ExComm or for Consultations:
Charles Bohlen: Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Llewellyn Thompson: Ambassador at Large for Soviet Affairs
Edwin Martins: Assistant Secretary of State (Latin American Bureau)
Dean Acheson: Former Secretary of State
Robert Lovett: Former Secretary of Defense
Walt Rostow: Department of State Policy Planner
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze
Consulted:
Former President Eisenhower
UN Secretary U Thant
Inside the CIA National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)
Washington D.C., 1962
Crisis Timeline
October 14-26, 1962
October 14: The U-2 Reconnaissance Mission. SS-4 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) sites found in varying stages of readiness.
October 15:
Discovery of Offensive Missiles in Cuba. Monday morning a team of photo interpreters make the crucial findings.
October 16:
The President is Informed. President Kennedy secretly convenes a group of advisers, later known as the Executive Committee or the National Security Council, or "ExComm."
October 17:
Options and Courses of Action
October 18:
More Surprises. Military Preparations. Gromyko lies to Kennedy, assuring him that Soviet assistance was solely for the defense of Cuba. When the president demands that Cuba be completely covered by U-2 photography, four additional MRBM sites and three IRBM sites are found.
October 19:
President Kennedy Returns to Washington. The findings of the previous day prompt the president to cancel his campaign trip to Chicago and head back to Washington. Reporters are told the president is suffering from a cold.
October 20: Setting the Course of Action.
October 21:
Notifying the Allies. Photo: Dean Rusk notifying the Organization of American States
October 22:
Address to the Nation. The Cuban missile crisis is made public by President Kennedy in a nationally televised address at 7pm. Low-altitude reconnaissance flights maintain close surveillance of Soviet activity on the island-adds a new dimension to reporting and allows detailed and pinpoint analysis of military activity.

President Kennedy Announces the Naval Blockade of Cuba

USS Gearing, a U.S. Destroyer, participating in the Naval Blockade
October 23:
Quarantine: In an unprecedented display of hemispheric solidarity, the Organization of American States (OAS) approves the U.S. quarantine. At 7:03pm, the president signs the quarantine proclamation, "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba."
October 24:
UN and Military Preparedness. The quarantine goes into effect at 10 a.m., EDT.
October 25:
Confrontation at the UN. On Thursday evening, October 25, in response to a challenge by Soviet Ambassador Zorin, Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, presents to the Security Council the hard photographic evidence of Russian deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba.
October 26:
The Crisis Deepens. U.S. destroyers stopped, boarded and inspected the Marcula, a dry-cargo ship of neutral registry sailing under Soviet charter to Cuba. At 6 p.m.
President Kennedy's Address to the Nation
The Red Threat. President Orders Blockade, 1962/10/22 (1962)
JFK speaks on Cuban Missile Crisis - "Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba" - "a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment has been initiated" - "clandestine, reckless" - JFK had meeting with Gromyko (partial newsreel)
White House photograph of President Kennedy meeting with Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Ambassador
October 18, 1962
Pinnacle of the Crisis...and Resolution
October 27-28, 1962
October 27 (Black Saturday): All the MRBM Sites are Operational. At 9 a.m., EDT, Khrushchev publicly proposes a settlement that would include removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. At the height of the crisis, U.S. Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., piloting a U-2, is brought down by a Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile. Low-altitude pilots report that they are being fired on by Cuban anti-aircraft weapons. All of the MRBM sites are now considered capable of launching missiles. Assembly of Il-28 Beagle light jet bombers are also continuing. The climax of the crisis comes after an ultimatum was given to the Soviets that the missiles must be removed. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy are prepared to strike Soviet bases in Cuba, and the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines are positioned to invade the island. At 7:45 p.m., EDT, Robert Kennedy meets with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. He emphasizes the urgency of a settlement and reaches an understanding regarding the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
October 28:
The Soviets Capitulate. On Sunday, October 28th, in a message to President Kennedy broadcasts over Radio Moscow at 9 a.m., EDT, Premier Khrushchev agrees to remove "the weapons which you describe as offensive" in return for assurances that the U.S. will not invade Cuba.
Confrontation at the United Nations
October 25, 1962
Possible Courses of Action
COA 1: Do Nothing. Advocated initially by Bundy on October 18th. Changed his mind the next day. Primary concern was over anticipated Soviet reprisals against Berlin. JFK felt that this COA would risk our alliances and our country in the long term.
COA 2: Diplomatic Pressures:
Advocated by Bohlen and Thompson. Proposed a secret ultimatum to Khrushchev demanding a removal of the missiles without a public confrontation or military action. Also advocated by Adlai Stevenson, who proposed an OAS Summit. Would guarantee demands for U.S. concessions. Echoes of appeasement.
COA 3: A Secret Approach to Castro.
"Split or Fall." ExComm COA quickly rejected because they didn't believe Castro could be tempted by the offer to divorce himself from Soviet Union. Also the missiles were under Soviet Control.

COA 4: Invasion.
Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated an invasion. Ultimately considered a last resort. Contingency plans had been made and practiced. Would force American troops to confront Soviet troops in the Cold War's first case of direct combat between ground forces of the superpowers. Risked disaster, including an equivalent Soviet move against Berlin.
COA 5: Air Strike.
Deemed far cleaner than an invasion. Remove the missiles before they were operational. JFK would make a public statement to the nation and to the Soviets as the planes approached their targets, describing his reasons and warning Moscow against retaliation. JFK leaned toward this option at the outset and remained tempted by it. Bundy and Acheson advocated a narrower, more surgical strike. Small version. Large Version of COA 5.
COA 6: Blockade.
First raised by McNamara on October 16th. Became more attractive as the president and his advisors dissected other alternatives. Sharpened into the blockade and ultimatum approach. (Ultimatum approach was
Cuban anti-aircraft gunners open fire on low-level reconnaissance planes over San Cristobal site No. 1
October 27, 1962
Post-Crisis Timeline
October-November 1962

October 29: The Beginning of Negotiations.
October 30:
U Thant Goes to Cuba.
November 1:
The Missiles Are Removed from Cuba. The MRBMs are hurriedly loaded as deck cargo. Inspections are also made at sea.
November 20:
After further negotiations, Premier Khrushchev agrees to remove IL-28 warplanes stationed in Cuba. President Kennedy lifts the blockade and cancels the heightened alert status of the Strategic Air Command.
General Conclusions
Ultimately, the Cuban Missile Crisis was the result of miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misjudgment at the highest levels of government. The records now available to us demonstrate that once Kennedy and Khruschev had sorted out their national interests and saw the collision course they both were set on, that stark realization, followed by lucid rationality steered both nations--and indeed, the world-- away from the brink of mutually assured destruction. Questions for Discussion
1. Why did the Soviet Union place strategic offensive missiles in Cuba?2. Why did the United States respond with a naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba?
3. Why were the missiles withdrawn?
4. What are the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
5. What role did luck play in a peaceful outcome to the crisis?
6. What are some of the actions that President Kennedy did NOT do that helped stabilize the crisis?
7. Did President Kennedy play any role in precipitating the Cuban Missile Crisis?
8. What kind of affect did the Vienna Conference have on the resolution of the crisis?
9. What kind of affect did the Bay of Pigs invasion have on the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
10. Did the ExComm regard Berlin as a bargaining chip in resolving the crisis?
11. Who do you think the "heroes" of The Cuban Missile Crisis crisis were?
Great Books about the Cuban Missile Crisis
Ultimate Sacrifice: John and Robert Kennedy, the Plan for a Coup in Cuba, and the Murder of JFK
Amazon Price: $9.99 (as of 05/09/2008)
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd Edition)
Amazon Price: $14.69 (as of 05/09/2008)
Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Amazon Price: $11.16 (as of 05/09/2008)
One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War
Amazon Price: $19.11 (as of 05/09/2008)
One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Amazon Price: $14.21 (as of 05/09/2008)
Cuban Missile Crisis Links
- History Out Loud: The Cuban Missile Crisis
- Audio tapes, transcripts and summaries from the October 18, 19, and 23-29 EXCOM meetings.
- Federation of American Scientists, Cuban Missile Crisis
- U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographs of Cuba.
- The State Department Foreign Relations of the United States
- Permanent electronic archive of Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath.
- The World On the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis
- JFK Museum Internet Exhibit on the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Yale University Avalon Project
- Documentary record of the Cuban Missile Crisis and its aftermath and U.S. policy toward Cuba from October 1962 to December 1963.
- Library of Congress Russian Archives
- Link to Nikita Khruschev's letter to President Kennedy. Translation also provided.
- John F. Kennedy's Address to the Nation
- Full text, audio mp3 and Real Video of John F. Kennedy's Cuban Missile Crisis Address to the Nation.
- CNN: Brinksmanship - You Make the Call
- This game of the Cold War, while based in fact, involves a measure of speculation. The advisers are fictional.
- Harvard University Belfer Center: The Cuban Missile Crisis
- A website developed by Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in cooperation with the producers of Thirteen Days. Its objective is to help movie viewers and others to explore historical facts of the Cuban Missile Crisis and analyze nuclear danger today.
Quick Poll
Great Cuban Missile Videos
on Amazon...
Thirteen Days (Infinifilm Edition)
Amazon Price: $8.99 (as of 05/09/2008)
The American President (PBS Box Set)
Amazon Price: $66.99 (as of 05/09/2008)
Crisis - Behind a Presidential Commitment
Amazon Price: $21.99 (as of 05/09/2008)
JFK - A Presidency Revealed (History Channel)
Amazon Price: $24.99 (as of 05/09/2008)
Profiles in Courage: A Kennedy Legacy
Amazon Price: $19.95 (as of 05/09/2008)
October 26, 1962: Boarding and Inspecting Soviet Cargo Ships
Quick Poll #2
U.S. Navy surveillance of first Soviet F-class submarine to surface near the quarantine line
October 25, 1962
Essential Sites on Nuclear and WMD Issues
- Apocalypse Soon
- Robert McNamara's 2005 Essay
- Nuclear Threat Initiative
- The Nuclear Threat Initiative is working to reduce the global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and is co-chaired by Ted Turner and Sam Nunn.
- DHS Ready.Gov
- Ready is a national public service advertising campaign produced by The Advertising Council in partnership with Homeland Security. The Ready Campaign is designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to emergencies, including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.
- Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe
- Graham Allison, founding dean of Harvard's modern John F. Kennedy School of Government, a former top Pentagon official, and one of America's leading scholars of nuclear strategy and national security, gives us an urgent call to action. He makes the case that nuclear terrorism is inevitable-if we continue on our present course-and he sets out an ambitious but achievable plan for preventing a catastrophic attack before it's too late.
Khrushchev's Description
[Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation from paperback edition, New York: Bantam, 1971), pp. 551-52]
The climax came after five or six days, when our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin's report went something like this:"Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights. 'The President is in a grave situation,' Robert Kennedy said, 'and does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba.
Probably at this very moment the President is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. That is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American army could get out of control."' To Learn More about the Cuban Missile Crisis....
Books and Video
1. Robert F. Kennedy's Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis(New York: W.W. Norton, 1969) and Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow's (eds.)
2. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis.
3. Scott D. Sagan's The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons
4. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), edited by Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss.
5. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), by George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon Wolfsthal.
6. The Academy Award-winning documentary film The Fog of War
directed by Errol Morris (Sony Pictures, 2003).
Quick Poll #3
The Official Communiques
- Letter from President Kennedy to Nikita Khrushchev, October 22, 1962
- JFK points out that the U.S. is pursuing a "minimum response" but will do whatever is necessary to assure its security.
- Report on the Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962
- In a nationally televised address, JFK outlines Cuba's threat to the peace and security of the Americas.
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to John Kennedy, October 23, 1962
- The Soviet prime minister accuses Kennedy of creating a "serious threat to peace."
- Letter from President Kennedy to Nikita Khrushchev, October 23, 1962
- JFK blames the Soviets for beginning the crisis and announces a naval quarantine of Cuba
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to John Kennedy, October 24, 1962
- The outraged Soviet leader rejects the American "ultimatum" and asserts that Soviet vessels will not honor the quarantine.
- Letter from Fidel Castro to Nikita Khrushchev, October 26, 1962
- Castro urges the Soviets to consider attacking the Americans if the U.S. invades Cuba.
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, October 28, 1962
- Khrushchev counsels Castro to stand firm and not respond to provocative American overflights of Cuban airspace.
- Letter from Fidel Castro to Nikita Khrushchev, October 28,1962
- The Cuban dictator explains to the Soviet prime minister why defending Cuban airspace is necessary.
- Nikita Khrushchev's Message to John Kennedy, October 28, 1962
- Khruschev announces the dismantling of Soviet missile bases in Cuba.
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, October 30, 1962
- The Soviet leader analyzes the outcome of the crisis and justifies his actions to Castro.
- Statement Announcing the End of the Cuban Naval Quarantine, November 20, 1962
- Kennedy lifts the quarantine after the Soviets agree to remove their bombers.
- Inaugural Address, 1961
- Kennedy announces that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans, and memorably concludes, "ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." (with RealAudio clip)
November 9, 1962: Low-level photograph of 6 Frog (Luna) missile transporters under a tree at a military camp near Remedios.
How Close did the Soviets Come to Pulling the Trigger?

It was the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. At about 5 p.m. on Oct. 27, 1962, a Soviet submarine armed with a nuclear warhead found itself trapped and being bombarded by a US warship patrolling off Cuba. One of the Soviet captains gave the order to prepare to fire....
- Boston Globe Article
- The story of Soviet Naval Officer, Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov.
Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Source: ThinkQuest.org
- Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
- A fun, interactive learning tool that incorporates role playing and speculation on what could have happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This simulation will allow you to take on the roles of any of three national leaders and make the decisions they had to make.
Quotable Quotes
From the Cuban Missile Crisis


"Well, it's a goddamn mystery to me. I don't know enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any other time since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so clear a provocation, I don't know when it's been."
(President Kennedy to Robert Kennedy)
"Well, let's wait. You don't have to worry, eating is the least of my worries."
(Robert McNamara to McGeorge Bundy on Black Saturday after his suggestion that they break for dinner)


"Well, I want to say, can I say that one other thing is whether we should also think of whether there is some other way we can get involved in this, through Guantanamo Bay or something. Or whether there's some ship that...you know, sink the Maine again or something."
(Robert Kennedy exploring options in the ExComm)

"This alternative doesn't seem to be a very acceptable one, but wait until you work on the others."
(Robert McNamara outlining the Blockade option to President Kennedy)

"The only offer we would make, it seems to me, that would have any sense, according to him, would be the...giving him some out, would be our Turkey missiles."
(President Kennedy to the ExComm)

"Mr. President, you might be interested in General Eisenhower's reaction to this. I talked to him at your request. I briefed him, showed him the photography and all the rest of this. ...I can report that the thrust of his comments would indicate that he felt first that the existence of offensive capabilities in Cuba was intolerable...he would recommend that--it should be an all out military action...a concentrated attack right on Havana first...."
(DCI John McCone to President Kennedy)

Robert Kennedy: "Then what do we do?"
Maxwell Taylor: "Go to general war, if it's in the interest of ours."
President Kennedy: "You mean nuclear exchange?
[-Brief Pause-]
Maxwell Taylor: "Guess you have to."

"We were eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked."
(Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President Kennedy)
Tribute to John F. Kennedy
John Fitzgerald Kennedy A Tribute
This tribute is for the 35th President of the United States: John F. Kennedy During his presidency, we saw the beginning of the Space Race and the American Civil Rights Movement. Major events during the Kennedy Administration included the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Music is from Oliver Stone's Film "JFK" (1991), which is composed by John Williams. NO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT INTENDED!!!
Political, Managerial and Diplomatic Tools
President Kennedy Used to Resolve the Crisis
- Backchannels
- Television Address
- Diplomatic Channels
- Diplomatic Cables (Department of State Teletype)
- United Nations Security Council
- White House Tapes
- DEFCON/Readiness Levels and Troop Movements
- Blockade/Quarantine
- U-2 and Air Reconnaissance Assets
- Luck
Could it Happen Again?
- 20 mishaps that might have started an accidental nuclear war
- Twenty Close-calls of the Nuclear Kind
- How I stopped nuclear war
- The incredible story of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov
- Russian Colonel Who Averted Nuclear War Receives World Citizen Award
- More on Colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov
- Russian Federation Press Release on
- The official Russian Press Release on Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov
New Quick Poll
The Doomsday Clock
The Doomsday Clock is a symbolic clockface maintained since 1947 by the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at the University of Chicago. It uses the analogy of the human race being at a time that is a 'few minutes to midnight' where midnight represents destruction by nuclear war.Current Time
The Doomsday Clock was last moved (from 7 minutes to midnight) on 17 January 2007 and currently stands at five minutes to midnight.
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John
Robert F. Kennedy Remembers...
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: New American Library, 1969), 107-109.

I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about 7:15 P.M. and asked him to come to the Department of Justice. We met in my office at 7:45. I told him first that we knew that work was continuing on the missile bases in Cuba and that in the last few days it had been expedited. I said that in the last few hours we had learned that our reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2s had been shot down and the pilot killed. That for us was a most serious turn of events.
President Kennedy did not want a military conflict. He had done everything possible to avoid a military engagement with Cuba and with the Soviet Union, but now they had forced our hand. Because of the deception of the Soviet Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then we would have to shoot back. This would inevitably lead to further incidents and to escalation of the conflict, the implications of which were very grave indeed.
He said the Cubans resented the fact that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not violated Cuban air space, we would still be believing what Khrushchev had said- that there would be no missiles placed in Cuba. In any case, I said, this matter was far more serious than the air space of Cuba-it involved the peoples of both of our countries and, in fact, people all over the globe.
The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming privately and publicly that this would never be done. We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be removed. I was not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them. President Kennedy had great respect for the Ambassador's country and the courage of its people. Perhaps his country might feel it necessary to take retaliatory action; but before that was over, there would be not only dead Americans but dead Russians as well.
He asked me what offer the United States was making, and I told him of the letter that President Kennedy had just transmitted to Khrushchev. He raised the question of our removing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure and that in the last analysis this was a decision that would have to be made by NATO. However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Italy and Turkey for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone.
I said President Kennedy wished to have peaceful relations between our two countries. He wished to resolve the problems that confronted us in Europe and Southeast Asia. He wished to move forward on the control of nuclear weapons. However, we could make progress on these matters only when the crisis was behind us. Time was running out. We had only a few more hours-we needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Union. I said we must have it the next day.
I returned to the White House....
Khrushchev Remembers...
Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation from paperback edition, New York: Bantam, 1971), pp. 551-52
The climax came after five or six days, when our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin's report went something like this:"Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights. 'The President is in a grave situation,' Robert Kennedy said, 'and does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. Probably at this very moment the President is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev.
We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. That is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American army could get out of control."' I'm a Jurist for the "People's Choice" Initiative
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This lens was selected by Squidoo as the "Lens of the Day" on October 18, 2006 to commemorate the 44th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the following commentary:"History is alive on Squidoo! The Cuban Missile Crisis took place 44 years ago from October 14- 28th. What would you have done if you were Castro, Kennedy, or Khrushchev? Check out the Crisis Simulation game, join the discussion, watch the video."




























