Thirteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis
Ranked #142 in Culture & Society, #3,624 overall
The Most Dangerous Two Weeks in History...
In the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union dispatched a fleet of commercial cargo ships filled with nuclear missiles, launchers and anti-aircraft guns--all under false manifests--across the Atlantic Ocean to Fidel Castro's Cuba. Forty thousand Soviet soldiers and technicians began clandestinely erecting an extensive array of armed missile sites, and aiming their nuclear-tipped medium range ballistic missiles at the United States. Nikita Khruschev and his key military advisors thought that the missiles would remain unnoticed until November, and then he planned to suddenly reveal them to the United States as a fait accompli. They were nearly successful. But in mid-October, with the Soviet tankers still enroute, American U-2 spy planes and CIA photo analysts detected several Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) on Cuban soil, their sites still under construction. In the weeks that followed, both nations stood at the brink of nuclear holocaust. Never before in history has the world come closer to a general nuclear war. On this 46th Anniversary of those events, during a presidential election year, understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis today is arguably more important than it has ever been.
Squidoo's Lens of the Year for 2007!
Squidoo named Thirteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis Lens of the Year for 2007!Many thanks to all who voted for this lens!
Several years ago, I had the opportunity to sit down over dinner with Ted Sorenson, one of President Kennedy's closest advisors. We discussed the Cuban Missile Crisis at length and it was obvious to me as we spoke, that this singular event had a profound and enduring effect on him--to this day. This seminal event in our nation's history continues to be studied at all of our nation's war colleges. Those discussions, public and private, prompted me to craft this lens.
I'm honored to have Thirteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis named Lens of the Year. And I'm humbled--there are so many supremely talented lensmasters with superb lenses on Squidoo. And so, for me, it's a great privilege to be a part of the Squidoo community!
Pre-Crisis Timeline
1960-1962 (The roots of the crisis began two years prior).
July 9, 1960: Khruschev declares that "speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with rocket fire."
July 12, 1960:
Khruschev declares the Monroe Doctrine "dead."
October 19, 1960:
The U.S. ends all exports to Cuba except nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies.
April 17-19, 1961:
CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion fails.
June 3-4, 1961:
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev meet in Vienna.
February 3, 1962:
President Kennedy embargoes all trade with Cuba except for medical necessities.
May 24, 1962:
The Soviet Defense Ministry formally decides to send nuclear missiles to Cuba.
Throughout the summer of 1962:
U.S. Surveillance of heavy volume of Russian shipping bound for Cuba. Emerging picture of the military build-up worries John A. McCone, DCI. He increases U-2 overflights, concerned that the Soviets might introduce offensive weapons into Cuba. The first photographic proof of surface-to-air missile deployments in Cuba was obtained on August 29, 1962. Also confirms seven KOMAR guided-missile patrol boats in the naval port of Mariel, twenty-seven miles west-southwest of Havana. Reveals a cruise-missile launch site that could be launched against invading forces.
August 31, 1962:
Republican Senator Kenneth Keating warns of possible Soviet "Rocket installations in Cuba" and urges President Kennedy to act. This sentiment echoes in Congress through the first three weeks of October.
September 4:
President Kennedy issues a press statement that denies evidence of offensive military weapons in Cuba but warns, "Were it otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."
September 13:
At a press conference, President Kennedy declares that if Cuba were to "become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."
September 20:
The Senate resolves by a vote of 86 to 1 to sanction the use of force, if necessary, "to prevent the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military capability endangering the security of the U.S." Six days later the House of Representatives passes this resolution by a vote of 384 to 7.
The Threat
Why the Crisis?
The SS-4 Sandal MRBM could launch a three-megaton warhead to an estimated range of 1,020 nautical miles that could reach targets as far away as Washington, D.C., Dallas, or the Panama Canal. CIA briefing board for JFK showing range of Soviet MRBMs
Bobby Kennedy on 16 October jokingly asked whether the missiles could hit Oxford, Mississippi, where federal marshals had intervened only two weeks earlier, so Oxford was included.
The Miscalculations
Kennedy had decided--and publicly announced--that the Soviets would never deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba. Given the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev had decided that the United States would certainly acquiesce in their deployment. The Political Risk
The missiles emplaced in Cuba endanger all U.S. foreign policy because the presence, left unchallenged, would effectively signal the Kremlin, Western allies, wavering neutrals, and the American people that the president would not uphold publicly stated vital interests to a threat at the country's "doorstep." There was also a domestic risk--President Kennedy was acutely aware of his administration's failed Bay of Pigs invasion and how it was playing out at home. Especially after his previous public pronouncements that the United States would never accept nuclear missiles in Cuba, giving in to Soviet demands now, with an election not far away, Kennedy knew, could be politically fatal. The Players
Cuba:Fidel Castro. Castro doesn't agree with the Soviet argument that Cuba needs nuclear missiles to defend itself. He would be satisfied with a formal alliance or a few Soviet brigades that could act as a trip wire to engage the Soviets in any war with the United States. From the outset, Castro feels strongly that harboring Soviet missiles might compromise his reputation for independence and tarnish his revolutionary image in Latin America. He nonetheless readily accepts Khrushchev's plan, with the idea that it will reinforce the position of the entire communist bloc. Fidel says he's glad to be of service to the world communist cause.
The Soviet Union:
Premier Nikita Khrushchev (68 years old)
Anatoly Dobrynin: Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Andrei Gromyko: Soviet Foreign Minister
Valerian A. Zorin: Head of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations.

The United States:
Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the National Security Council and the president. Received all source intelligence reports and recommended options for various courses of action to the president.
President Kennedy (45 years old)
Robert Kennedy: Attorney General
Lyndon Johnson: Vice President
Roswell Gilpatrick: Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Maxwell Taylor: CJCS
John A. McCone: DCI
McGeorge Bundy: National Security Assistant to the President
Robert McNamara: Secretary of Defense
Dean Rusk: Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson: Under Secretary of State
Douglas Dillon: Secretary of Treasury
George Ball: Deputy Secretary of State
Ted Sorenson: Chief Domestic Policy Advisor to the President
Adlai Stevenson: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Experts Brought in to the ExComm or for Consultations:
Charles Bohlen: Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Llewellyn Thompson: Ambassador at Large for Soviet Affairs
Edwin Martins: Assistant Secretary of State (Latin American Bureau)
Dean Acheson: Former Secretary of State
Robert Lovett: Former Secretary of Defense
Walt Rostow: Department of State Policy Planner
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze
Consulted:
Former President Eisenhower
UN Secretary U Thant
Crisis Timeline
October 14-26, 1962
October 14: The U-2 Reconnaissance Mission. SS-4 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) sites found in varying stages of readiness.
October 15:
Discovery of Offensive Missiles in Cuba. Monday morning a team of photo interpreters make the crucial findings.
October 16:
The President is Informed. President Kennedy secretly convenes a group of advisers, later known as the Executive Committee or the National Security Council, or "ExComm."
October 17:
Options and Courses of Action
October 18:
More Surprises. Military Preparations. Gromyko lies to Kennedy, assuring him that Soviet assistance was solely for the defense of Cuba. When the president demands that Cuba be completely covered by U-2 photography, four additional MRBM sites and three IRBM sites are found.
October 19:
President Kennedy Returns to Washington. The findings of the previous day prompt the president to cancel his campaign trip to Chicago and head back to Washington. Reporters are told the president is suffering from a cold.
October 20: Setting the Course of Action.
October 21:
Notifying the Allies. Photo: Dean Rusk notifying the Organization of American States
October 22:
Address to the Nation. The Cuban missile crisis is made public by President Kennedy in a nationally televised address at 7pm. Low-altitude reconnaissance flights maintain close surveillance of Soviet activity on the island-adds a new dimension to reporting and allows detailed and pinpoint analysis of military activity.

President Kennedy Announces the Naval Blockade of Cuba

USS Gearing, a U.S. Destroyer, participating in the Naval Blockade
October 23:
Quarantine: In an unprecedented display of hemispheric solidarity, the Organization of American States (OAS) approves the U.S. quarantine. At 7:03pm, the president signs the quarantine proclamation, "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba."
October 24:
UN and Military Preparedness. The quarantine goes into effect at 10 a.m., EDT.
October 25:
Confrontation at the UN. On Thursday evening, October 25, in response to a challenge by Soviet Ambassador Zorin, Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, presents to the Security Council the hard photographic evidence of Russian deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba.
October 26:
The Crisis Deepens. U.S. destroyers stopped, boarded and inspected the Marcula, a dry-cargo ship of neutral registry sailing under Soviet charter to Cuba. At 6 p.m.
Pinnacle of the Crisis...and Resolution
October 27-28, 1962
October 27 (Black Saturday): All the MRBM Sites are Operational. At 9 a.m., EDT, Khrushchev publicly proposes a settlement that would include removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. At the height of the crisis, U.S. Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., piloting a U-2, is brought down by a Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile. Low-altitude pilots report that they are being fired on by Cuban anti-aircraft weapons. All of the MRBM sites are now considered capable of launching missiles. Assembly of Il-28 Beagle light jet bombers are also continuing. The climax of the crisis comes after an ultimatum was given to the Soviets that the missiles must be removed. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy are prepared to strike Soviet bases in Cuba, and the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines are positioned to invade the island. At 7:45 p.m., EDT, Robert Kennedy meets with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. He emphasizes the urgency of a settlement and reaches an understanding regarding the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
October 28:
The Soviets Capitulate. On Sunday, October 28th, in a message to President Kennedy broadcasts over Radio Moscow at 9 a.m., EDT, Premier Khrushchev agrees to remove "the weapons which you describe as offensive" in return for assurances that the U.S. will not invade Cuba.
Possible Courses of Action
COA 1: Do Nothing. Advocated initially by Bundy on October 18th. Changed his mind the next day. Primary concern was over anticipated Soviet reprisals against Berlin. JFK felt that this COA would risk our alliances and our country in the long term.
COA 2: Diplomatic Pressures:
Advocated by Bohlen and Thompson. Proposed a secret ultimatum to Khrushchev demanding a removal of the missiles without a public confrontation or military action. Also advocated by Adlai Stevenson, who proposed an OAS Summit. Would guarantee demands for U.S. concessions. Echoes of appeasement.
COA 3: A Secret Approach to Castro.
"Split or Fall." ExComm COA quickly rejected because they didn't believe Castro could be tempted by the offer to divorce himself from Soviet Union. Also the missiles were under Soviet Control.

COA 4: Invasion.
Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated an invasion. Ultimately considered a last resort. Contingency plans had been made and practiced. Would force American troops to confront Soviet troops in the Cold War's first case of direct combat between ground forces of the superpowers. Risked disaster, including an equivalent Soviet move against Berlin.
COA 5: Air Strike.
Deemed far cleaner than an invasion. Remove the missiles before they were operational. JFK would make a public statement to the nation and to the Soviets as the planes approached their targets, describing his reasons and warning Moscow against retaliation. JFK leaned toward this option at the outset and remained tempted by it. Bundy and Acheson advocated a narrower, more surgical strike. Small version. Large Version of COA 5.
COA 6: Blockade.
First raised by McNamara on October 16th. Became more attractive as the president and his advisors dissected other alternatives. Sharpened into the blockade and ultimatum approach. (Ultimatum approach was
Post-Crisis Timeline
October-November 1962

October 29: The Beginning of Negotiations.
October 30:
U Thant Goes to Cuba.
November 1:
The Missiles Are Removed from Cuba. The MRBMs are hurriedly loaded as deck cargo. Inspections are also made at sea.
November 20:
After further negotiations, Premier Khrushchev agrees to remove IL-28 warplanes stationed in Cuba. President Kennedy lifts the blockade and cancels the heightened alert status of the Strategic Air Command.
General Conclusions
Ultimately, the Cuban Missile Crisis was the result of miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misjudgment at the highest levels of government. The records now available to us demonstrate that once Kennedy and Khruschev had sorted out their national interests and saw the collision course they both were set on, that stark realization, followed by lucid rationality steered both nations--and indeed, the world-- away from the brink of mutually assured destruction. Questions for Discussion
1. Why did the Soviet Union place strategic offensive missiles in Cuba?2. Why did the United States respond with a naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba?
3. Why were the missiles withdrawn?
4. What are the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
5. What role did luck play in a peaceful outcome to the crisis?
6. What are some of the actions that President Kennedy did NOT do that helped stabilize the crisis?
7. Did President Kennedy play any role in precipitating the Cuban Missile Crisis?
8. What kind of affect did the Vienna Conference have on the resolution of the crisis?
9. What kind of affect did the Bay of Pigs invasion have on the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
10. Did the ExComm regard Berlin as a bargaining chip in resolving the crisis?
11. Who do you think the "heroes" of The Cuban Missile Crisis crisis were?
Great Books about the Cuban Missile Crisis
Cuban Missile Crisis Links
- History Out Loud: The Cuban Missile Crisis
- Audio tapes, transcripts and summaries from the October 18, 19, and 23-29 EXCOM meetings.
- Federation of American Scientists, Cuban Missile Crisis
- U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographs of Cuba.
- The State Department Foreign Relations of the United States
- Permanent electronic archive of Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath.
- The World On the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis
- JFK Museum Internet Exhibit on the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Yale University Avalon Project
- Documentary record of the Cuban Missile Crisis and its aftermath and U.S. policy toward Cuba from October 1962 to December 1963.
- Library of Congress Russian Archives
- Link to Nikita Khruschev's letter to President Kennedy. Translation also provided.
- John F. Kennedy's Address to the Nation
- Full text, audio mp3 and Real Video of John F. Kennedy's Cuban Missile Crisis Address to the Nation.
- CNN: Brinksmanship - You Make the Call
- This game of the Cold War, while based in fact, involves a measure of speculation. The advisers are fictional.
- Harvard University Belfer Center: The Cuban Missile Crisis
- A website developed by Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in cooperation with the producers of Thirteen Days. Its objective is to help movie viewers and others to explore historical facts of the Cuban Missile Crisis and analyze nuclear danger today.
Quick Poll
Great Cuban Missile Videos
on Amazon...
Quick Poll #2
Essential Sites on Nuclear and WMD Issues
- Apocalypse Soon
- Robert McNamara's 2005 Essay
- Nuclear Threat Initiative
- The Nuclear Threat Initiative is working to reduce the global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and is co-chaired by Ted Turner and Sam Nunn.
- DHS Ready.Gov
- Ready is a national public service advertising campaign produced by The Advertising Council in partnership with Homeland Security. The Ready Campaign is designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to emergencies, including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.
- Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe
- Graham Allison, founding dean of Harvard's modern John F. Kennedy School of Government, a former top Pentagon official, and one of America's leading scholars of nuclear strategy and national security, gives us an urgent call to action. He makes the case that nuclear terrorism is inevitable-if we continue on our present course-and he sets out an ambitious but achievable plan for preventing a catastrophic attack before it's too late.
Khrushchev's Description
[Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation from paperback edition, New York: Bantam, 1971), pp. 551-52]
The climax came after five or six days, when our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin's report went something like this:"Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights. 'The President is in a grave situation,' Robert Kennedy said, 'and does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba.
Probably at this very moment the President is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. That is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American army could get out of control."' To Learn More about the Cuban Missile Crisis....
Books and Video
1. Robert F. Kennedy's Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis(New York: W.W. Norton, 1969) and Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow's (eds.)
2. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis.
3. Scott D. Sagan's The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons
4. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), edited by Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss.
5. Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), by George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon Wolfsthal.
6. The Academy Award-winning documentary film The Fog of War
directed by Errol Morris (Sony Pictures, 2003).
Quick Poll #3
The Official Communiques
- Letter from President Kennedy to Nikita Khrushchev, October 22, 1962
- JFK points out that the U.S. is pursuing a "minimum response" but will do whatever is necessary to assure its security.
- Report on the Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962
- In a nationally televised address, JFK outlines Cuba's threat to the peace and security of the Americas.
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to John Kennedy, October 23, 1962
- The Soviet prime minister accuses Kennedy of creating a "serious threat to peace."
- Letter from President Kennedy to Nikita Khrushchev, October 23, 1962
- JFK blames the Soviets for beginning the crisis and announces a naval quarantine of Cuba
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to John Kennedy, October 24, 1962
- The outraged Soviet leader rejects the American "ultimatum" and asserts that Soviet vessels will not honor the quarantine.
- Letter from Fidel Castro to Nikita Khrushchev, October 26, 1962
- Castro urges the Soviets to consider attacking the Americans if the U.S. invades Cuba.
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, October 28, 1962
- Khrushchev counsels Castro to stand firm and not respond to provocative American overflights of Cuban airspace.
- Letter from Fidel Castro to Nikita Khrushchev, October 28,1962
- The Cuban dictator explains to the Soviet prime minister why defending Cuban airspace is necessary.
- Nikita Khrushchev's Message to John Kennedy, October 28, 1962
- Khruschev announces the dismantling of Soviet missile bases in Cuba.
- Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Fidel Castro, October 30, 1962
- The Soviet leader analyzes the outcome of the crisis and justifies his actions to Castro.
- Statement Announcing the End of the Cuban Naval Quarantine, November 20, 1962
- Kennedy lifts the quarantine after the Soviets agree to remove their bombers.
- Inaugural Address, 1961
- Kennedy announces that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans, and memorably concludes, "ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." (with RealAudio clip)
November 9, 1962: Low-level photograph of 6 Frog (Luna) missile transporters under a tree at a military camp near Remedios.
How Close did the Soviets Come to Pulling the Trigger?

It was the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. At about 5 p.m. on Oct. 27, 1962, a Soviet submarine armed with a nuclear warhead found itself trapped and being bombarded by a US warship patrolling off Cuba. One of the Soviet captains gave the order to prepare to fire....
- Boston Globe Article
- The story of Soviet Naval Officer, Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov.
Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
Source: ThinkQuest.org
- Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
- A fun, interactive learning tool that incorporates role playing and speculation on what could have happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This simulation will allow you to take on the roles of any of three national leaders and make the decisions they had to make.
Quotable Quotes
From the Cuban Missile Crisis
-


"Well, it's a goddamn mystery to me. I don't know enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any other time since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so clear a provocation, I don't know when it's been."
(President Kennedy to Robert Kennedy) -

"Well, let's wait. You don't have to worry, eating is the least of my worries."
(Robert McNamara to McGeorge Bundy on Black Saturday after his suggestion that they break for dinner)
-


"Well, I want to say, can I say that one other thing is whether we should also think of whether there is some other way we can get involved in this, through Guantanamo Bay or something. Or whether there's some ship that...you know, sink the Maine again or something."
(Robert Kennedy exploring options in the ExComm) -


"This alternative doesn't seem to be a very acceptable one, but wait until you work on the others."
(Robert McNamara outlining the Blockade option to President Kennedy) -


"The only offer we would make, it seems to me, that would have any sense, according to him, would be the...giving him some out, would be our Turkey missiles."
(President Kennedy to the ExComm) -


"Mr. President, you might be interested in General Eisenhower's reaction to this. I talked to him at your request. I briefed him, showed him the photography and all the rest of this. ...I can report that the thrust of his comments would indicate that he felt first that the existence of offensive capabilities in Cuba was intolerable...he would recommend that--it should be an all out military action...a concentrated attack right on Havana first...."
(DCI John McCone to President Kennedy) -


Robert Kennedy: "Then what do we do?"
Maxwell Taylor: "Go to general war, if it's in the interest of ours."
President Kennedy: "You mean nuclear exchange?
[-Brief Pause-]
Maxwell Taylor: "Guess you have to."
-


"We were eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked."
(Secretary of State Dean Rusk to President Kennedy)
Political, Managerial and Diplomatic Tools
President Kennedy Used to Resolve the Crisis
- Backchannels
- Television Address
- Diplomatic Channels
- Diplomatic Cables (Department of State Teletype)
- United Nations Security Council
- White House Tapes
- DEFCON/Readiness Levels and Troop Movements
- Blockade/Quarantine
- U-2 and Air Reconnaissance Assets
- Luck
Could it Happen Again?
- 20 mishaps that might have started an accidental nuclear war
- Twenty Close-calls of the Nuclear Kind
- How I stopped nuclear war
- The incredible story of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov
- Russian Colonel Who Averted Nuclear War Receives World Citizen Award
- More on Colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov
- Russian Federation Press Release on
- The official Russian Press Release on Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov
New Quick Poll
The Doomsday Clock
The Doomsday Clock is a symbolic clockface maintained since 1947 by the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists at the University of Chicago. It uses the analogy of the human race being at a time that is a 'few minutes to midnight' where midnight represents destruction by nuclear war.Current Time
The Doomsday Clock was last moved (from 7 minutes to midnight) on 17 January 2007 and currently stands at five minutes to midnight.
Your Feedback!
Did you find this lens interesting? Please rate the lens by clicking the stars at the top of the screen.Many Thanks!
John
Robert F. Kennedy Remembers...
Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: New American Library, 1969), 107-109.

I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about 7:15 P.M. and asked him to come to the Department of Justice. We met in my office at 7:45. I told him first that we knew that work was continuing on the missile bases in Cuba and that in the last few days it had been expedited. I said that in the last few hours we had learned that our reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2s had been shot down and the pilot killed. That for us was a most serious turn of events.
President Kennedy did not want a military conflict. He had done everything possible to avoid a military engagement with Cuba and with the Soviet Union, but now they had forced our hand. Because of the deception of the Soviet Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then we would have to shoot back. This would inevitably lead to further incidents and to escalation of the conflict, the implications of which were very grave indeed.
He said the Cubans resented the fact that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not violated Cuban air space, we would still be believing what Khrushchev had said- that there would be no missiles placed in Cuba. In any case, I said, this matter was far more serious than the air space of Cuba-it involved the peoples of both of our countries and, in fact, people all over the globe.
The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming privately and publicly that this would never be done. We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be removed. I was not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them. President Kennedy had great respect for the Ambassador's country and the courage of its people. Perhaps his country might feel it necessary to take retaliatory action; but before that was over, there would be not only dead Americans but dead Russians as well.
He asked me what offer the United States was making, and I told him of the letter that President Kennedy had just transmitted to Khrushchev. He raised the question of our removing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure and that in the last analysis this was a decision that would have to be made by NATO. However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Italy and Turkey for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone.
I said President Kennedy wished to have peaceful relations between our two countries. He wished to resolve the problems that confronted us in Europe and Southeast Asia. He wished to move forward on the control of nuclear weapons. However, we could make progress on these matters only when the crisis was behind us. Time was running out. We had only a few more hours-we needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Union. I said we must have it the next day.
I returned to the White House....
Khrushchev Remembers...
Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation from paperback edition, New York: Bantam, 1971), pp. 551-52
The climax came after five or six days, when our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin's report went something like this:"Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights. 'The President is in a grave situation,' Robert Kennedy said, 'and does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. Probably at this very moment the President is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev.
We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. That is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American army could get out of control."' I'm a Jurist for the "People's Choice" Initiative
I'm honored to be a jurist in Squidoo's "People's Choice" Initiative led by one of Squidoo's very best lensmasters, Margaret Schaut.It's a wonderful way for lensmasters to recognize their favorite Squidoo lenses!
Great Stuff on CafePress
Squidoo's Lens of the Day!
This lens was selected by Squidoo as the "Lens of the Day" on October 18, 2006 to commemorate the 44th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the following commentary:"History is alive on Squidoo! The Cuban Missile Crisis took place 44 years ago from October 14- 28th. What would you have done if you were Castro, Kennedy, or Khrushchev? Check out the Crisis Simulation game, join the discussion, watch the video."
Vote for the Best Books on The Cuban Missile Crisis!
The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Cold War Goes Hot (Monumental Milestones: Great Events of Modern Times) (Monumental Milestones: Great Events of Modern Times) by Jim Whiting
The United States and the Soviet Union were the tw more...0 points
Great Stuff on eBay
What Was At Stake: The Soviet Missiles and their Ranges

SS-4 SANDAL and SS-5 SKEAN
Warheads: Single
Yield: 1-1.3/2-2/3 Mt 1.0 or 2.0 -2.3 Mt
Range(km): 2,000 km 4500 or 3200 -3700 km
Background Information: The SS-4 was the first Soviet strategic missile using storable propellants and a completely autonomous inertial guidance system. With its capability to deliver a megaton-class nuclear warhead the rocket provided a capability to attack strategic targets at medium ranges. This system constituted the bulk of the Soviet offensive missile threat to Western Europe. It was deployed at both soft launch pads and hard silos.
The SS-5 was a single-stage, storable liquid-propellant, intermediate range ballistic missile. As with the SS-4, the Skean missile was a single stage missile with integral fuel tanks though it was larger and twice the maximum range.
Source: AtomicArchive.com
Think You Know About the Cuban Missile Crisis? Here are Two Quizes for You!
Hint: All of the Answers are in the Lens Above!
* President Kennedy was informed of the missiles on this date:
* Who was the Soviet Premier during the Crisis?
* Upon the recommendation of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, what action did Kennedy decide would be best to take?
* Which of the following was the name of the committee of Kennedy's advisors?
* Kennedy met with two Soviet foreign ministers during the crisis. Who were they?
* President Kennedy demanded a unanimous vote from which organization before ordering the blockade effective?
* From Kennedy's remarks to the nation, 'I call upon Chairman (Omitted)to halt and eliminate this _______, reckless and ______ threat to world peace...'
* The Soviet Premier announced the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba on what date?
* Who was the Secretary of State during the crisis?
* Who were the two leaders (US and USSR) during the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC)?
* What scenario did the top brass of the military try to 'sell' to Kennedy to remove the missiles from Cuba?
* What military action did Kennedy eventually take?
* The immediate root cause of the Cuban missile crisis can be traced to what event?
* What forum did the US use to publicly embarrass the USSR?
* What did the US give in exchange for the Cuban missiles?
* What have been the long term effects on US/Cuban relations?
* During the CMC, what did Khrushchev constantly accuse the US of?
* What was set up between the US and USSR right after the CMC?
* What spy plane was used over Cuba?
* In which year did the United States become aware of Soviet plans to station missiles in Cuba?
- Cuban Missile Crisis Quiz
- This one is more difficult...
- Cuban Missile Crisis Quiz II
- This one is easier...
Why is the Cuban Missile Crisis Relevant Today?
From The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1987

"We should be wary of hastily dismissing this event as irrelevant to the present; certain crucial factors have not changed since 1962, or have become all the more important because of the changes in the strategic balance: the psychology of crisis decision-making; the importance of small-group politics; and the risks of inadvertent escalation. But we should also be wary of drawing generalizations that ignore important ways in which the world has changed, that cannot be supported by evidence from a single crisis, and that are insensitive to the fact that diplomatic or strategic successes can rarely be repeated in quite the same way. This last consideration was one President Kennedy himself understood well from his reading of Barbara Tuchman?s The Guns of August. The German leadership in 1914 had expected a repeat of Russia?s backdown in the Bosnian crisis of 1909. Instead, they found themselves embroiled in the costliest war mankind had yet seen."
"There is disagreement on the relevance of the Cuban missile crisis to today's world. Either there are many lessons, emphasizing the need for flexibility, precision and caution, or there are none, because the nuclear danger in 1962 was imaginary and represented only a failure to comprehend US military superiority. One can conclude that the crisis should not be dismissed as irrelevant; certain crucial factors have not changed. But there is a need for caution in attempting to read from it simple lessons in crisis management."

Ted Sorenson remembers the Cuban Missile Crisis
From Minnesotal Public Radio
- Listen to Ted Sorenson's Speech at the Kennedy Library

Forty-five years ago, President John F. Kennedy announced that the U.S. had spotted "offensive missile sites" in Cuba capable of launching an attack on America. In a recent speech at the Kennedy Library, JFK's aide Theodore Sorenson explained how the U.S. averted a possible nuclear war with the USSR.
From a recent New York Times Interview with Ted Sorenson...."Kennedy's rhetoric when he was president turned out to be a key to his success. His mere words about Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba helped resolve the worst crisis the world has ever known without the U.S. having to fire a shot."
Isn't it melodramatic to call the Cuban missile crisis the worst crisis ever? What about, say, World War I?
"With all due respect, with World War I the survival of the earth was not at stake."
Did You Know....
According to Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, in May 1962 he conceived the idea of placing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of countering an emerging lead of the United States in developing and deploying strategic missiles. He also presented the scheme as a means of protecting Cuba from another United States-sponsored invasion, such as the failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. A Modern-Day Parallel: Putin raises spectre of Cuban Missile Crisis
AFP/Reuters: Posted Sat Oct 27, 2007 5:10am AEST

Russian President Vladimir Putin has compared the US missile shield to Russia's attempt to move missiles to Cuba in the 1960s.
Russia's President Vladimir Putin has drawn a parallel between US plans for a missile shield in Europe and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, widely regarded as the closest the world came to nuclear war.
But the Kremlin leader added that his personal friendship with US President George W Bush has helped to prevent the latest US initiative from turning into a new global disaster.
"I would remind you how relations were developing in an analogous situation in the middle of the 1960s," he told a news conference after the Russia-EU summit in Portugal.
"Analogous actions by the Soviet Union when it deployed rockets on Cuba provoked the Cuban missile crisis," Mr Putin added.
"For us, technologically, the situation is very similar. On our borders such threats to our country are being created."
"Thank God, there is no Caribbean crisis [Cuban crisis] now, mainly because Russia's relations with the European Union and the United States have changed a lot."
A decision by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to send nuclear missiles to Communist ally Cuba put the world on the brink of nuclear war in 1962. After days of dramatic negotiations, Mr Khrushchev agreed to pull out the missiles.
Russia has been outraged by the US decision to deploy a radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland to avert potential missile strikes from countries like Iran. It sees the plan as an outright threat to its security.
In Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack strongly rejected Mr Putin's comparison between the US missile shield proposal and the Cuban crisis.
"There are some very clear historical differences between our plans to deploy a defensive missile system designed to protect against launch of missiles from rogue states such as Iran, and the offensive nuclear capability of the missiles that were being installed in Cuba back in the 1960s," Mr McCormack said.
"They are not historically analogous in any way, shape or form," he added.
Arms race
In a demonstration of potential consequences, a top Russian military commander said Moscow could resume the production of short and medium-range nuclear missiles, similar to those which threatened Western Europe in the mid-1980s.
"If there is a political decision to make such a class of missile, then it is obvious that they will be made in Russia in the near future because we have everything we need," Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov said in Moscow.
In an attempt to stop the US plan, Mr Putin has promised to allow Washington use a radar it rents in Azerbaijan, built in the Soviet days to monitor the Indian Ocean zone, or a new radar with even wider range located in Southern Russia.
He has also proposed setting up a joint missile defence system, which would include European countries.

President John F. Kennedy, right, confers with his brother Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy at the White House in Washington, D.C., Oct. 1, 1962, during the buildup of military tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that became the Cuban missile crisis.

President John F. Kennedy, left foreground, meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, right foreground, and U.S. Ambassador to Russia Llewellyn Thompson, center, during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Address to the American People about the Cuban Missile Crisis
October 22, 1962

The White House
October 22, 1962
Good evening, my fellow citizens:
This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.
Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.
The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.
Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far-and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.
This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base-by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13- This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.
The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to- ground missiles and the existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11th that, and I quote, "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," that, and I quote the Soviet Government, "there is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons. . . for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote their government, "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false.
Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive, and if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents an efficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.
For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history-unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II-demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's-eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.
In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger-although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.
But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles-in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil-is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.
The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.
Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required-and it is under way; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth-but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.
Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.
Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The foreign ministers of the OAS, in their communiqué of October 6th, rejected secrecy on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.
Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.
Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.
Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements-and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.
Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.
Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction-by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba- by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis- and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.
This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum-in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful-without limiting our freedom of action. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides- including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union-for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.
But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat-or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week-must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed- including in particular the brave people of West Berlin-will be met by whatever action is needed.
Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed- and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas-and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war-the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil.
These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny your freedom.
Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the association of nations of this hemisphere.
My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead-months in which both our patience and our strength will be tested-months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.
The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are- but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high-but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.
Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right-not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.
Thank you and good night.
U.S. Missile Sites at the Ready...
At Long Last! A Guest Book!
My apologies for taking so long to incorporate a guest book into this lens! Your comments are welcomed!
-
Reply
-
CruiseReady
Feb 5, 2011 @ 1:41 am | delete
- Incredible lens.
I willl never forget leaving for school that morning, Mom and I saw through the fog what appeared to be a mountain that grown had at the end of our street overight. (Our street ended in the Atlantic) It was a warship, on the way to blockade Cuba. That made it awfully and suddenly very real for us.
-
-
Reply
-
cwimmer77
Dec 17, 2010 @ 9:45 am | delete
- lets hope we never have to worry about an event like this again in our lifetimes.
-
-
Reply
-
MarkUpshaw Nov 11, 2010 @ 1:54 am | delete
- What an excellent lens. Thumbs up and FB like.
-
-
Reply
-
ViolinStudent Sep 30, 2010 @ 12:56 pm | delete
- Thanks for the work and the info. I turned 8 less than a week before the crisis came to light. I remember the Missile Crisis very well, even though I was a child. I will say, though, that even as a young elementary school student I wondered what kneeling down and covering my neck would do other than make me harder to find when the walls fell down on me. Scary time.
-
-
Reply
-
PizmoBeach
Sep 29, 2010 @ 5:27 pm | delete
- An excellent lens. I have recently read Bobby Kennedy's account so it was fantastic to stumble upon your lens which has a great analysis of the crisi.
-
- Load More
Former Kennedy Advisors Muse Over Cuban Missile Crisis
Source; The Harvard Crimson, published On 10/21/2002 12:00:00 AM

Former advisors to John F. Kennedy '40 relived the tension of the Cuban missile crisis at the Kennedy School of Government's ARCO Forum Friday, 40 years after the U.S. teetered on the brink of nuclear war.
Former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and former Special Counsel and Adviser to President Kennedy Theodore Sorensen charmed the packed crowd with their frank recounting of the 1962 nuclear face-off between the U.S. and Soviet Union.
We were "arguing what in the hell to do," McNamara said of the White House 40 years ago.
The missile crisis was "the most dangerous moment in our recorded history," said Graham Allison, director of the Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
The discussion centered around news clips of the time and portions of the movie Thirteen Days.
McNamara looked delighted with the Hollywood version of his argument with Admiral George Anderson in which he shouted not to open fire on Soviet ships approaching the American naval quarantine.
"I'd just like to say, that's how ambassadors of Portugal are made," said Sorensen, who is currently a fellow at the Institute of Politics.
Anderson was appointed the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal following the missile crisis.
McNamara said of Anderson, "He didn't know a damn thing about his geo-politics."
Although the policy dispute dramatized by Hollywood did have basis in fact, he said the movie did not get everything right.
"It never occurred that way," McNamara told the audience. "If I made [the film], it would've been more accurate."
The former advisors also enthralled the audience with little-known or recently-discovered details of the crisis.
McNamara said Soviet submarines armed with nuclear warheads had lost communication with Moscow and lurked in waters near the U.S. for four days after the crisis was resolved.
The crowd gasped as he added, "When they got back, they were given hell for not using [the warheads]."
"We lucked out," McNamara said several times during the discussion. He attributed much of the narrowly-averted disaster to misunderstanding.
A question-and-answer session followed the discussion.
Audience members said they enjoyed the open, candid tone of the event.
"McNamara is one of the wittiest, most intelligent guys I've ever heard speak," said Joey M. Hanzich '06.
When asked, McNamara declined to comment on America's present treatment of Iraq, saying that as a former secretary of defense, it wasn't his position to criticize the president's current foreign affairs policy.
But he did assert his stance on nuclear weapons-a statement that received the biggest applause of the evening.
"We've got to get rid of the damn things." McNamara said.
"Agent Hero:" JFK's Spy from Moscow
Source: Wikipedia

Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, codenamed "Agent Hero" (born April 23, 1919, Vladikavkaz, died May 16, 1963, Soviet Union), was a colonel with Soviet military intelligence (GRU) in the late 1950s and early 1960s who passed important secrets to the West. He is considered one of the best assets the West ever had in the Soviet Union.
Penkovsky eventually persuaded Greville Wynne to arrange a meeting with two American and two British intelligence officers during a visit to London in 1961. Wynne became one of his couriers. For the following eighteen months he supplied a tremendous amount of information to his Secret Intelligence Service handlers in Moscow, Ruari and Janet Chisholm, and to CIA and SIS contacts during his permitted trips abroad. Most significantly, he was responsible for arming President John F. Kennedy with the information that the Soviet nuclear arsenal was much smaller than previously thought, that the Soviet fueling systems were not fully operational, and that the Soviet guidance systems were not yet functional.

Penkovsky was arrested by the KGB on 22 October 1962--before Kennedy's address to the nation revealing that U-2 spyplane photographs had confirmed intelligence reports that the Soviets were installing medium range nuclear missiles on the Caribbean Island--code named Operation Anadyr. Thus, the President was deprived of potentially important intelligence that might have lessened the tension during the ensuing 13-day stand-off; e.g., such as the fact that Khrushchev was already looking for ways to defuse the situation. Such information, arguably, would have reduced the pressure on Kennedy to launch an invasion of the island--an action which, it is now known, would have led to the use of Luna class tactical nuclear weapons against US troops, as the Soviet commander, General Issa A. Pliyev, in charge had been given permission to use the weapons without consulting Moscow first.

Penkovsky's Fate
Penkovsky was tried and convicted of treason and espionage in a show trial in 1963. As to his fate after conviction, accounts differ. Some sources allege that Penkovsky was executed by the traditional Soviet method of a bullet to the back of the neck and cremated. GRU author Vladimir Rezun, "Viktor Suvorov" claims in Inside Soviet Military Intelligence that Penkovsky was bound to a board with piano wire and 'cremated alive.' A more graphic account states that he was slowly fed into a furnace alive, feet first, as his closest friends were made to watch on, as a warning to other potential moles, a punishment that "The Soviets meted out to only their worst traitors."
The Enduring Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis...
Excerpt from: Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Secret Struggles with the Superpowers after the Cuban Missile Crisis, by James G. Blight and Philip Brenner

...In reality, Kennedy was both more flexible than the early postmortems suggested and more sensitive to the Soviet need to salvage something positive from the crisis. In order to buy some time and avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviets, on October 25 he permitted a Soviet tanker (the Bucharest) to proceed through the quarantine. On October 28 the president instructed the ExComm members, as Robert Kennedy recalled, "that no interview should be given, no statement made which would claim any kind of victory. [President Kennedy] respected Khrushchev for properly determining what was in his own country's interest and what was in the interest of mankind." Perhaps most importantly, he offered up removal of the U.S. missiles in Turkey and was prepared to accept a public trade of the missiles if that was necessary to prevent a conflagration. The appropriate lesson that should have been drawn from this behavior, then, is that flexibility, compromise, and respect for an adversary's calculus of its vulnerability is essential for the peaceful outcome of a crisis. Instead, the traditional view of what is needed in a crisis-toughness and inflexibility-seemingly has guided U.S. officials for decades, in confrontations from Vietnam to Iraq.
A second lesson of the crisis emerged from the plaudits given to Kennedy for the way he handled the crisis. Arthur Schlesinger captured this lesson-that crises can be managed-in his elusive observation that the world escaped a nuclear war and the United States achieved its aims because of the president's "combination of toughness and restraint, of will, nerve, and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated." A clearer way of stating this lesson, though, might be that nuclear crises can be managed only when several unlikely conditions are present: leaders have sufficient time away from the glare of the media to learn about each other's positions and interests; good fortune at that moment provides each of the adversaries with leaders who have adroit political skills, the political will to limit their objectives, and sufficient self-confidence to reject advice from forceful advisers; and unforeseen events and unanticipated behavior by any of the thousands of people involved does not set off an uncontrollable chain reaction.
Since then, there have been many critiques of the view that the United States can act with blithe confidence that nuclear crises can be managed, though none is more poignant than the one articulated by Robert McNamara, who originally had embraced the traditional view. He noted that, had the Soviets launched any of their nuclear weapons in 1962, "the damage to our own [country] would have been disastrous." Then he added,
"But human beings are fallible. We know we all make mistakes. In our daily lives, mistakes are costly, but we try to learn from them. In conventional war, they cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. But if mistakes were to affect decisions related to the use of nuclear forces, there would be no learning period. They would result in the destruction of entire nations. Therefore, I strongly believe that the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons carries a very high risk of a potential nuclear catastrophe."
If Another Nuclear Crisis Occurred Today, Where Would It Be Managed?
Opportunism or Fear?
...What was Khruschev Thinking?

The Russian perspective of the Cuban Missile Crisis was, predictably, far different than the American perspective. As Cold War politics continued to dominate the world stage, the failed U.S.-planned and sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion was a prime catalyst for Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who believed that the United States could make another attempt at overthrowing his ally in the Western Hemisphere-- Fidel Castro. Khruschev's decision to emplace the missiles was therefore as much as a deterrent as they were a threat. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the United States had placed nuclear missiles in Turkey, well within range of Russia--so in many respects placing Russian missiles in Cuba was nothing more than a quid pro quo....
Source: wired.com
"It Took Miracle..."
Source: VFP62.com

President Kennedy presenting the Navy Unit Commendation to VFP-62. Photo Credit: Bill Hile
We did not have much build-up time...[for] The Cuban missile crisis; We had 29 aircraft, 7 Detachments, using 20 of them, and 2 not flyable (cannibalized). We only had 2 or 3 with the new 5 inch format Chicago Aerial Cameras installed, that worked. The mission called for 8 camera ready Birds, and we had 7. I had never seen so many FLASH messages, and near instant supply response.We commandeered 4 aircraft from the VMCJ outfit at Cherry Pt, (most of their stuff didn't work; stab systems, as well as cameras),and all they had installed were the old 70 mm cameras.
We got the word late Monday, and the first mission was set for the following Sunday at 8AM, for 8 camera ready birds to take off from Key West. It took a minor miracle but we did it.
There is a whole lot more to this story that most folks don't know. Sunny Jim Curry was a J.O. not yet assigned to a detachment and he flew test hops day and night, checking the latest tweek on camera systems. We had to ensure that everything would work at high speed low level (500 ft,550-600 knots). We didn't usually operate that way. It was truly an exciting time.
-John DeChant Cdr, USN Ret and Squadron Maintenance Officer during the Cuban Missile Crisis
Jackie Kennedy's Contribution...
Source: FirstLadies.org

"One of the most significant events during the Kennedy administration was the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy's actions during that event prevented what could have been the first nuclear war. One of the lesser known facts regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis is that Jacqueline Kennedy insisted on staying in the White House during the crisis, instead of going to the underground bunker. A key component of the Cuban Missile Crisis strategy was to, initially, keep the situation "top secret." President Kennedy did so by maintaining his official responsibilities, such as welcoming ambassadors from other countries, and also keeping private social dates, such as attending dinner parties. President Kennedy was known as a man who excelled at compartmentalizing his life. One way that he alleviated stress was by attending private dinner parties. Jacqueline Kennedy, who was responsible for organizing the private dinner parties that alleviated President Kennedy's stress, thus played an indirect role in the Cuban Missile Crisis."
The Moscow Bunker...
Known as Tagansky Protected Command Point, the bunker lies 180 meters below Moscow and is rumored to have been the operation center for the Soviet regime during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Tagansky bunker was used to house the communications headquarters of the Soviet leadership and top military officials. With stores of food and medicine, as many as 3,000 people could live and work in the underground network for 90 days without assistance from the "outside world" thanks to its air recycling system and diesel generators.
Photo Source: Ametist102's Flickr Page
Source: Foreign Policy Magazine (online)
Lens Index
- Squidoo's Lens of the Year for 2007!
- John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy (Outside the Oval Office)
- Pre-Crisis Timeline
- Soviet Ships Carrying Offensive Armaments to Cuba
- The Threat
- CIA reference photograph of Soviet medium-range ballistic missile in Red Square, Moscow.
- CIA briefing board for JFK showing range of Soviet MRBMs
- The Miscalculations
- The Political Risk
- The U-2 Plane
- U.S. Navy low-level photograph of San Cristobal MRBM site No. 1
- The Players
- Inside the CIA National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)
- Crisis Timeline
- President Kennedy's Address to the Nation
- White House photograph of President Kennedy meeting with Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Ambassador
- Pinnacle of the Crisis...and Resolution
- 23 October 1962: The Washington Post
- Confrontation at the United Nations
- Possible Courses of Action
- Cuban anti-aircraft gunners open fire on low-level reconnaissance planes over San Cristobal site No. 1
- Post-Crisis Timeline
- General Conclusions
- Questions for Discussion
- October 17, 1962: U-2 photograph of first IRBM site found under construction.
- Great Books about the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Cuban Missile Crisis Links
- Quick Poll
- Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba
- Great Cuban Missile Videos
- October 26, 1962: Boarding and Inspecting Soviet Cargo Ships
- Quick Poll #2
- U.S. Navy surveillance of first Soviet F-class submarine to surface near the quarantine line
- Essential Sites on Nuclear and WMD Issues
- The Missiles of October...
- Khrushchev's Description
- Graphic of the U.S. invasion plan, 1962.
- To Learn More about the Cuban Missile Crisis....
- Quick Poll #3
- The Official Communiques
- November 9, 1962: Low-level photograph of 6 Frog (Luna) missile transporters under a tree at a military camp near Remedios.
- How Close did the Soviets Come to Pulling the Trigger?
- Backyard Fallout Shelter in the 1960s
- Cuban Missile Crisis Simulation
- Quotable Quotes
- Political, Managerial and Diplomatic Tools
- Could it Happen Again?
- New Quick Poll
- The Doomsday Clock
- Your Feedback!
- U.S. Titan Missile in its Silo...
- What Was Averted...
- Robert F. Kennedy Remembers...
- Khrushchev Remembers...
- I'm a Jurist for the "People's Choice" Initiative
- Great Stuff on CafePress
- Squidoo's Lens of the Day!
- Vote for the Best Books on The Cuban Missile Crisis!
- Great Stuff on eBay
- What Was At Stake: The Soviet Missiles and their Ranges
- Think You Know About the Cuban Missile Crisis? Here are Two Quizes for You!
- Why is the Cuban Missile Crisis Relevant Today?
- Ted Sorenson remembers the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Robert F. Kennedy and Ted Sorenson
- Did You Know....
- President Kennedy's Schedule during the Cuban Missile Crisis...
- Another OpEd Cartoon from the Cuban Missile Crisis...
- A Modern-Day Parallel: Putin raises spectre of Cuban Missile Crisis
- Address to the American People about the Cuban Missile Crisis
- Where Were the Soviet Ships?
- Soviet IL-28 Attack Aircrafter Clandestinely Deployed in Cuba...
- The Face-Saving Solution:
- U.S. Missile Sites at the Ready...
- At Long Last! A Guest Book!
- Former Kennedy Advisors Muse Over Cuban Missile Crisis
- "Agent Hero:" JFK's Spy from Moscow
- Demonstrating for Peace...
- The Enduring Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis...
- If Another Nuclear Crisis Occurred Today, Where Would It Be Managed?
- Opportunism or Fear?
- "It Took Miracle..."
- Jackie Kennedy's Contribution...
- The Moscow Bunker...
- What Do You Think?
- Why it May be Important for YOU to Know about the Cuban Missile Crisis...
- The Other Cuban Missile Crisis? :-)
- Guantanamo: The First Nuclear Target...
- The Downed U2 Spy Plane that JFK Never Knew About....
- Not So Fast...
- The Shootdown of Major Anderson...
- "Eyeball to Eyeball" ...a Myth?
- The Presidential Speechwriters
- Follow Me on Twitter!
- The Thirteen Days in October
- 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis
- My recollections of the Cuban Missile Crisis
What Do You Think?
Could the World Face another Nuclear
Fetching blurbs now... please stand by
KokoTravel says:
The state of world affairs is nothing less than distressing and concerning!
Posted January 17, 2011
SemperFidelis says:
Absolutely! The U.S. has far too many enemies these days!
Posted December 20, 2008
Joe Tedesco says:
I believe the world "will" face another nuclear crisis. But who knows if next time it will be with someone as reasonable as Khrushchev? Iran, or other like nations & terrorist groups come to mind. It is no secret terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons.
Posted December 02, 2008
AnnaLise says:
Gosh I hope not! Heck, the Cuban Missile Crisis was scary enough. But, hey, there's all the potential in the world that it could happen.
Posted November 05, 2008
Doriano Pulpito says:
I think thanks to American superiory Nuclear and conventional Forces the President John F Kennedy can to force Soviets withdrawn their missiles from Cuba nothing more make this.
thanks
Doriano from Brasil
Posted November 26, 2010
hannah, 15, Aust says:
no we couldn't. our world is already perishing quickly thanks to carbon emissions and a nuclear war would destroy thousands of homes and leave thousands homeless. Australia trades with many different nations and if an important trade company from another country gets blown up then australia could loose a vital source for the nation and leave thousands without jobs which would give those families no income and could eventually leave them homeless. we can definitely could not survive another nuclear war. I'm 15 and if we have another nuclear war
Posted June 21, 2008
asfas says:
Booooooom..
Posted May 28, 2008
Ciri says:
With the growing proliferation of nuclear weapons by rogue regimes, we could indeed face another missile crisis--although not likely in the same form as the one we faced in October, 1962. The next nuclear crisis will be more dangerous, less controlled and the precipice of conflict closer and steeper than ever before....
Posted April 19, 2008
Why it May be Important for YOU to Know about the Cuban Missile Crisis...
Why should I learn about the Cuban Missile Crisis, you ask? Well, here are two clips--above and below--that show why knowledge of historical events like the Cuban Missile Crisis (or for that matter, the Bay of Pigs, Berlin Airlift...you name it!) is so important....
The Other Cuban Missile Crisis? :-)
A JFK Anecdote...

One day in 1961, shortly after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, JFK called his cigar-smoking press secretary Pierre Salinger into the Oval Office.
"I need a lot of cigars," he declared. "How many, Mr. President?" Salinger asked. "About a thousand," Kennedy replied. "Tomorrow morning, call all your friends who have cigars and just get as many as you can." Salinger dutifully raced out to find as many H. Upmann petits as he could find.
The following morning he received an urgent message requesting his immediate presence in the Oval Office. "How did you do on the cigars last night?" Kennedy asked. "Mr. President, I was very successful," Salinger replied. "I got eleven hundred."
Hearing this, Kennedy opened a drawer in his desk and produced a decree banning all Cuban products from entry into the United States. "Good," he declared. "Now... I can sign this!"
[Trivia: In April 1996, Cigar Aficionado editor and publisher Marvin Shanken bought JFK's walnut cigar humidor at a Sotheby's auction - for $574,500.]
Guantanamo: The First Nuclear Target...
Source: National Security Archive
Washington, DC, June 4, 2008 - Soviet nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were ready to destroy the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo had the U.S. military persuaded President Kennedy to invade Cuba during the missile crisis in 1962, according to a new book by Washington Post reporter Michael Dobbs (citing documents and interviews posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive, www.nsarchive.org).
The documents show that U.S. intelligence listed the Soviet weapons as "unidentified artillery" pieces, when they were actually cruise missiles armed with Hiroshima-sized nuclear devices. They were deployed to within 15 miles of the Guantanamo base on the same day -- October 27, 1962 -- that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an all-out U.S. invasion of Cuba to destroy the Soviet missile bases. President Kennedy rejected the advice of his military advisers in favor of a diplomatic solution to the crisis that included a secret understanding between his brother and the Soviet ambassador.
The new book, One Midnight to Midnight, draws on the National Security Archive's long-standing documentary work on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Dobbs conducted extensive interviews with Soviet combat veterans and discovered previously undisclosed U.S. intelligence documents that explode the myth of successful crisis management and offer new insights into how a U.S. president makes decisions at a time of grave international crisis.
Over the next five weeks, the National Security Archive will publish more of the key primary sources behind One Minute to Midnight. These postings will include such episodes as the storage and handling of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba and the "Eyeball to Eyeball" confrontation between U.S. and Soviet ships that never happened.
The Downed U2 Spy Plane that JFK Never Knew About....
Washington, DC, June 11, 2008 - An American spy plane went missing over the Soviet Union at the height of the Cuban missile crisis for one and a quarter hours without the Air Force informing either President Kennedy or Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, according to a new book by Washington Post reporter Michael Dobbs.
The accidental intrusion into Soviet air space by a U-2 belonging to the Strategic Air Command on October 27, 1962, is still classified Top Secret by the Air Force and has received little attention from missile crisis historians. Dobbs discovered a map in the National Archives that reveals for the first time the precise route taken by Captain Charles Maultsby as he was chased by Soviet Mig Fighters over the Chukotka Peninsula.
The Air Force was able to track Maultsby's flight route by intercepting Soviet Air Defense communications, but did not inform McNamara about the incident until Maultsby left Soviet air space, ran out of fuel, and glided home to Alaska. Khrushchev later expressed concern that the intruding U.S. plane could have been mistaken "for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step."
Not So Fast...
Source: National Security Archives
Washington, DC, June 18, 2008 - The CIA failed to identify the storage bunkers for Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, despite obtaining numerous photographs of the sites.
The precise location of the Soviet nuclear storage bunkers at Bejucal and Managua is revealed for the first time in a new book by Washington Post reporter Michael Dobbs based on interviews with Soviet veterans and raw U.S. intelligence film. Declassified CIA documents show that U.S. intelligence analysts at the time concluded that the sites could not be used for the storage of nuclear weapons because of the lack of visible security measures such as guard posts and extra fencing.
The Shootdown of Major Anderson...
"Eyeball to Eyeball" ...a Myth?
A new book by Washington Post reporter Michael Dobbs plots the positions of Soviet and American ships on October 24, 1962, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that "we were eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked." It shows that the missile-carrying ships were already headed back to the Soviet Union at this point, and were at least 500 nautical miles from the closest American warship.
The Presidential Speechwriters
“I don't think the intelligence reports are all that hot. Some days I get more out of the NYT. -JFK”
Follow Me on Twitter!

- aka Twitter
- 0 followers
- 0 following
-
- When you're riding in a time machine way far into the future, don't stick your elbow out the window, or it'll turn into a fossil.
-
- I think the mistake a lot of us make is thinking the state-appointed shrink is our friend.
-
- Does the President Really Matter? My take, in "The Georgetowner".... http://t.co/5Vdni9AA
-
- Best of all #SuperBowlCommercials ever: Chrysler/Clint Eastwood
-
- $3 Million per 30 seconds? Worst. #SuperBowlCommercials. Ever.
1962: Cuban Missile Crisis

"Generations to come may well count John Kennedy's resolve as one of the decisive moments of the 20th century. For Kennedy determined to move forward at whatever risk. And when faced by that determination, the bellicose Premier of the Soviet Union first wavered, then weaseled and finally backed down."
From: The Backdown, Nov. 02, 1962
My recollections of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Ozzie F. Díaz-Duque
Sometime late in 1960 or early 1961 (I can't recall), the state mass media started reporting an imminent threat from the United States. Everyone was speaking of an invasion, but we had no clue when or where. I lived in Guanajay, then in the Pinar del Río province (Castro has since changed it to the province of La Habana). My house was on the "carretera central" or main highway connecting La Habana with the rest of the interior to the west. I was in "Escuela Secundaria Básica," what you would call high school in the U.S. It was also on this main highway. I walked to school daily (3 kilometers), and we started noticing an increase in military vehicles, especially some we had never seen before. By February or March of 1961, small Russian tanks (I don't know what kind, but they were very noisy) started moving through our town's main street, going east. Most of the time it was at night, but I do remember seeing them during the day. My classmates and I would run after them, as we were astonished to see these machines. At around the same time, there were sudden blackouts beginning at 9:00 p.m. or so, and most people just stayed home. These coincided with a lot of traffic, mainly huge machines of the type you use for highway construction, tractors, and many military trucks. I was always curious about these vehicles, and often went out to see them, which infuriated my mother. Although there was no government warning to stay off the streets, somehow we knew we weren't supposed to notice this daily caravan. It was as if nothing was going on. This seemed ridiculous to everyone, since buildings shook as these vehicles went by. In April, I believe, the state imposed a "toque de queda" (curfew) beginning at 8:00 p.m. At the same time, the main road going west (to the adjacent beach town of Mariel, in particular) was closed. The word on the street was that Fidel Castro had ordered the construction of a "super highway" with six lanes, which would replace the much smaller main highway. We thought this was madness, as in our part of the island there was no need for such a project. Very few people had cars, and this seemed rather odd. I remember my father telling me that the true reason for this construction was the creation of a huge military airport, with very wide and long landing strips. But why here? In the meantime, the CDRs started a "people's education campaign" to prepare us for the imminent invasion. The CDR (Comité de Defensa de la Revolución) was basically someone's house in every block, with a "civil agent" of the government who was in charge of organizing activities, serve as liaison with the local government, etc. In reality, these were hard core "revolucionarios" who watched every move made by those who lived in that particular block. The CDR representative started visiting homes, under the guise of checking if we had proper housing. We found out later that, in reality, they were trying to find out who had short wave radios. At the time, these were our only contact with the outside world, mainly via The Voice of America. If they found such a radio, they would confiscate it. We had one, but my father hid it among his barrels of honey (he was a beekeeper) when we were visited. Listening to the La Voz de las Américas became a state crime, so we had to listen only at night, in the back of the house, at low volume. That is, whenever we had electricity. Curiously, one day we couldn't get the station at all, and my father explained that something must be blocking it. We were also afraid that the government could detect this, so we stopped using that radio. Therefore, the only news we had from then on came from state media. At this time, our town was visited by hundreds of soldiers (all of them from somewhere else in the island), and they measured streets, checked constructions of buildings, and put up signs here and there saying "Con cautela" (with caution). A few days later, traffic increased at night, and soldiers were posted everywhere, including side streets. We were informed that for reasons of state security, we had to stay home, and away from doors and windows. My family respected this, but my curiosity was too much. I did peek, and saw very large trucks, most of them covered with olive green tarps. The shapes seemed to be cylindrical, at times one, at other times two or three of them. They moved very slowly, which afforded me a good look at the cargo. One time I could clearly see what in my mind was a spaceship, or rocket. The tips of these things were red, with some type of symbol or lettering I could not make out. At other times, the trucks were carrying square things, very large, also covered. Each of of these enormous vehicles had an escort of soldiers in trucks; sometimes their weapons were pointed at the sidewalks. This went on for weeks. Suddenly, by July or August (I can't remember), this traffic stopped. However, all main roads going east and west were closed. Beginning in September, things became increasingly horrifying. From my house, I could see flood lights searching the sky, and occasional gun fire. These increased, and I remember marvelling at the light patterns made in the dark sky by anti-artillery fire. I guess I was too young to realize the seriousness of this, but I recall my mother would burst into tears and grab the first picture of Jesus she could find and pray. One day in October, I don't know exactly, one of my aunts and I decided to visit a relative just a few blocks from my house. Suddenly, the lights went out, and all hell broke lose. We didn't know what to do, but my aunt said that my mother would kill her if she didn't return me home. So, we left that house in total darkness, and began walking slowly. It was just too dark to walk any faster. In a matter of seconds, the sky was illuminated by all sorts of lights, and we heard aircraft engines almost above our heads. There were explosions, anti-artillery fire, a lot of smoke in the sky, and we could actually see a few aircraft flying abou us. We were horrified. My aunt knocked on a few doors, seeking refuge, but no one would let us in. She decided to make a run for my house, and all I remember was the pain I felt in my hand, so hard was she holding on to me. We finally made it home, in the midst of more explosions and gunfire in the distance, coming from the east. It took a while, but my father finally opened the door. My family was in the back of the house, my mother hanging on to a picture of a saint to whom she was very devoted. The building shook, and someone thought we should go across the street where there was a large, solid building. However, with all the commotion outside, we decided to stay at home. I was placed under a sink, with a piece of wood in my mouth. We had been instructed to do that in case of bombings, and I can still taste the wood. After an hour or so, silence. An hour later, the electricity came back on. We had no clue if this had been an invasion, if the U.S. forces had taken over the government, or anything. My last recollection of that evening is funny to me now. In the confusion and melée, everyone forgot about me under the sink. I was so terrified, I didn't move and continued biting that piece of wood as hard as I could. Eventually, someone came to get me. I had bitten the wood so hard, they had trouble getting the piece out of my mouth, which was by then bleeding. In the next few days, we were informed by radio of what had happened, from the government's point of view. Nothing was said about nuclear warheads, missiles, the Soviet Union and Kennedy, etc.
by John_Fenzel
John Fenzel is the author of the novel, The Lazarus Covenant. Learn more at: www.JohnFenzel.com
View John's Blog at: http://johnfenzel.typepad.com/
more »
- 12 featured lenses
- Winner of 6 trophies!
- Top lens » Thirteen Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis
- This lens » Selected as Lens of the Day
Explore related pages
- Veterans and Veterans of War - USA Veterans and Veterans of War - USA
- Support Our Troops and Veterans Support Our Troops and Veterans
- Ron Paul Polls and Debate - USA Presidential Election 2012 Ron Paul Polls and Debate - USA Presidential Election 2012
- Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln
- Presidential Trivia: The Three U.S. Presidents With The Most Popular Votes Presidential Trivia: The Three U.S. Presidents With The Most Popular Votes
- Restoring The American Dream Restoring The American Dream
































































