Preview of mini-e-book.

What is Truth?

Introduction:

It seems that we are motivated by a need for certainty. The need to know what is true in our lives and what is false. When something is 'true' we feel safe in its certitude, we know what it is, where it is, and what will happen next. When something is 'false' it is not to be trusted, it creates unease and it should be avoided. Being true is dependable and reputable; being false is untrustworthy and bad. So, the prospect of finding the truth about truth is very appealing.

Unfortunately the question 'what is truth?' means dealing with something even more disconcerting than simple 'falsehood' it means we have to confront 'ambiguity', an uncertain limbo-land where we can't quite conclude with any degree of confidence what something is or is not. Ambiguity is the nemesis of our instinct for certainty; with ambiguity we can never be sure of 'touching the walls'. This is a scary place. If I can't decide what truth is am I feeble and stupid? Am I weak and indecisive? Am I merely running with the foxes and chasing with hounds? Ultimately I can, of course, be more confident of one thing and that is my opinion about truth, I can at least attempt an answer to the question 'what is my understanding of truth?'

The use of a map metaphor in this context is inspired by David Lynch (2001) who suggests that a map might be just the thing for anyone who is "lost in the thickets of the contemporary debate" regarding the complex problem of truth. As well as providing a navigational device, the idea of maps also provides an immediate example of the sorts of issues that can arise when considering the subject of truth. Alfred Korzybski (1941) remarked that "the map is not the territory", claiming human beings can never access a true representation of reality because human sensory apparatus and language act as a sort of interpretative 'middleware' between the real world and the 'knower'. By implication, each person's map of the world is different; there is no uniquely correct version of the world. We could, of course, simply accept Korzybski's claim as true and unquestionable, however if we wish to take issue, we are faced with thinking carefully about and explicating our position in relation to notions of reality, objectivity, and subjectivity, logic and how we might be justified in believing what we do. Being "interconnected to so many other interesting philosophical concepts is%u2026why truth seems deep and why its seems important to understand what truth is" Lynch (2001: 2)

How easy is it to define truth?
When we begin to scratch the surface of any dictionary or everyday definition of Truth it starts to become clear that we are not dealing with something as obvious as we might have first thought. Everyday definitions of 'truth' are likely to relate truth to 'the facts', yet as soon as we agree on this, we can disagree what a 'fact' is because we know from our daily experiences that there can be 'versions' of the facts. People come to know that there are facts and there are opinions. Voltaire (Lynch 2001:1) suspecting that there are deep challenges in getting beyond a mundane definition of Truth dryly remarked that the Truth should be considered "while waiting for a better definition, as - a statement of facts as they are".

As soon the search for 'a better' definition of starts however, two main issues emerge:

Firstly, there is the problem posed by the conceptual nature of Truth itself. This means it is impossible to avoid using the term when discussing the concept. For example, if I say "Truth corresponds to reality" the truth of my claim is based on my version of what truth is. As Lynch (2005:2) explains "you cannot argue over a theory of truth without using the concept, because to question a theory, is to question its truth".

Secondly, what is it that we are really earching for when we ask 'What is Truth?' Here we can make the distinction between seeking:

o The 'Nature' of Truth, concerning the questions relating to its conceptual make up, and the theories that are put forward to capture this.

And the

o 'Explanatory role' of Truth, concerning how we determine what is true in the world.
The discussion of these issues requires us to engage with our ontological standpoint, (what we believe to exist), our epistemological standpoint, (how we can justify what we know), and the interrelationships between the two. Both of these notions are extensive areas of philosophical concern in their own right. In summary then:

Our ontological position represents our explanations of what we regard as 'real'. This can be fairly non-specific such as 'a culture' or very precise such as 'a tree' so that in crude terms the former implies an idealist ontology and the latter a 'realist'. Blaikie (2007:14-18) outlines a more sophisticated categorisation of 'realism', where at one end of the spectrum there are 'shallow realists' where only observable 'things' and events are admissible, associated with naturalism, the natural sciences and the contention that there is "little difference between the behaviour of inanimate objects and that of human beings, the logic of enquiry appropriate to the natural sciences can also be used in the social sciences" (Blaikie ibid) through, conceptual, cautious, and depth realist positions, on to the idealists who contend that the external world is made up entirely of representations in the mind, and finally the subtle realist who agrees that there are independent knowable entities, its just that we can't access them directly.

Our epistemological position involves us determining what we claim to be a warranted or justified belief. Robert Audi (1998) summarises our sources of justification, knowledge and truth as, Perception, Memory, Consciousness, Reason, and Testimony. Epistemologists carefully distinguish between knowledge and belief, causing us to face up to the conundrum that it is possible to believe things that are not true and disbelieve things that are true.

The significance of our epistemological position in relation to what we believe to be true is explained by Johnson and Dubberly (2000:1-2) who point out that epistemological commitments go frequently unrecognised, yet they are a "key feature of our pre-understandings which influence how we make things intelligible" going on to say that "our debates and conjectures about what is true pre-suppose prior agreement%u2026about how we determine whether or not something is true" The challenge this poses is not insignificant, and echoes the general problem of using truth to define truth mentioned above. This challenge is characterised as the 'circularity of epistemology' (Johnson and Dubberly 2000:4) whereby any epistemological position is based upon having an epistemological view about what that position should be, such that "everyone adheres to some theory about what constitutes warranted knowledge" (Johnson and Dubberly 2004:5) and as with ontological positions there are a range of epistemological positions that can be taken too. Broadly speaking these resolve out into Rationalist, where only the mind can be trusted, Positivist relying on empirical evidence, Relativist and socially constructed epistemologies, whereby truths are created in the minds of people. Each general position contains nuanced variations.

Understandings of ontological and epistemological claims therefore lie at the heart of any discussion concerning the nature of Truth, and the role of Truth in explanations. An example of their significance in relation to social science enquiry is given by Martin Hollis (1994) who shows how the different ontological and epistemological positions taken by Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill influences their explanation of the truth in social affairs. Marx uses a naturalistic ontology, that values the methods of natural science for investigating social concerns, sees a world that consists of, forces of production, and legal and political superstructures, whereas Mill ignores these 'things' and refers to individuals and their 'character' and is less confident in the scientific method. Marx's epistemology suggests that 'social beings determine consciousness' i.e. perceptions matter, whereas Mill confines "knowledge of the world to beliefs which observation can justify".

With the concepts of ontology and epistemology in mind, the themes of the Nature of Truth and the explanatory role of Truth will be discussed in more detail.

So, where does an interest in the phenomenon of gullibility come from?

Well, the idea orginated when a buddy of mine and I were thinking back over our expriences at home and the workplace. We were having a laugh at ourselves over those occaisions where we'd really been taken for fools and how we had learned from the experience.

We had, what we thought was a spark of inspiration to write a book called Gullibles Travels (after Gullivers Travels of course) only to find that others had beaten us to it. To read the full story go to Gullibility - Travels into Several Remote Notions

Gullibity is a collection of stories, ideas, and resources about how to avoid taking our beliefs for granted, ranging from zany news stories through to full on philosophical introductions to critical thinking, critical theory and the ways of knowing what we know.

The idea behind this lens and the gullibility blog is that we are all in a state of transition, and that sometimes difficult experiences, challenges to cherished ideas, and looking at things through new 'lenses' are part of that process. It is also our hope that we can show people the ideas and insights we have uncovered and link you to them.

As a result we are exploring what might be called 'several remote notions'; ideas that are slightly off the beaten track and a bit deeper than your usual 'celebophile' gossip column. 'Several remote notions' is an idea we are rather chuffed about as the proper title to Gulliver's Travels is... Travels into Several Remote Nations.

We hope to point you to some interesting stuff, and if you have eaten a beating moles heart - you'll know all of this anyway... if Pliny was right that is.