Home » Culture & Society » Military » History of War

Carl von Clausewitz

Ranked #3,189 in Culture & Society, #69,552 overall

On War... (and Peace too!)

Prussian general and intellectual-turned-theorist Carl von Clausewitz is the most famous theorist of war.  His classic 600-page work, On War is a look at war from the eye of a commander.  The "art of war" is Clausewitz's overarching theme, as he searches for those principles that explain success and failure on the battlefield, for those traits that define genius or mediocrity, and he sifts through the complexities of warfare so that commanders can succeed where so many others have failed.  Carl von Clausewitz is not for the faint of heart--his prose is complex and densely theoretical--but if you can transcend the Hegelian dialectic, then you will emerge with a better understanding of war and its true nature.  Its relevance is universal--whether the reader is a politician, a peace activist or a military commander, Carl von Clausewitz provided the world with a timeless work that applies just as much today as when he wrote it more than two hundred years ago!  This lens is just an introduction, designed to expose you to "Clause" as many would-be strategists often call him today.  To get a full appreciation of this classic theorist of war, however, you must open his book and read On War.

This is a longer lens than you'll typically see on Squidoo, but it's designed to give you a quick view of Clausewitz's most essential passages of On War....

Source: National War College Syllabus

Why is Clausewitz Cool?

Source: Clausewitz.com

Clausewitz served as a practical field soldier (with extensive combat experience against the armies of the Revolutionary France), as a staff officer with political/military responsibilities at the very center of the Prussian state, and as a prominent military educator. Clausewitz first entered combat as a cadet at the age of 13, rose to the rank of Major-General at 38, married into the high nobility, associated with the high social strata and intellectuals in Berlin, and wrote a book which has today emerged as the most influential work of military philosophy in the Western world. That book, On War (in the original German, Vom Kriege) has been translated into virtually every major language and remains a living influence on modern strategists in many fields. In short, Clausewitz is the epitomy of the warrior-poet-scholar!

I'm a Jurist for the "People's Choice" Initiative

I'm honored to be a jurist in Squidoo's "People's Choice" Initiative led by one of Squidoo's very best lensmasters, Margaret Schaut.

It's a wonderful way for lensmasters to recognize their favorite Squidoo lenses!

On War: The Author and The Book

Source: Wikipedia and Clausewitz.com

On War is divided into 128 chapters and sections, grouped into eight books. Clausewitz had two primary objectives: to use logical analysis to drill into the essence of war; and second, to understand war in all of the many forms it takes: as a social and political event, and in the strategic, operational and tactical dimensions. Theory and theoretical analysis were Clausewitz's methodology for studying war and explaining it! On War is still the most important work published on the phenomenon of war.

Some of the key ideas discussed in On War include:

-the dialectical approach to military analysis
-the methods of "critical analysis"
-the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
-the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
-the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
-the nature of "military genius" (involving matters of personality and character, beyond intellect)
-the "fascinating trinity" (wunderliche dreifaltigkeit) of war
-philosophical distinctions between "absolute or ideal war," and "real war"
-in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited war and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
-"war" belongs fundamentally to the social realm-rather than the realms of art or science
-"strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art
-"tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
-the importance of "moral forces" (more than simply "morale") as opposed to quantifiable physical elements
-the "military virtues" of professional armies (which do not necessarily trump the rather different virtues of other kinds of fighting forces)
-conversely, the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass"
-the essential unpredictability of war
the "fog" of war
-"friction"
-strategic and operational "centers of gravity"
-the "culminating point of the offensive"
-the "culminating point of victory"

Book One: "On the Nature of War"

Clausebust2bIn Book 1, Clausewitz defines the general characteristics of war in the social and political world, and identifies elements that are always present in the conduct of war: danger, physical and mental effort, psychological factors, and the many impediments to carrying out one's intentions, which Clausewitz collected under the concept of "friction."

Clausewitz's view of civil-military relations. Note that Clausewitz cautions against "asking soldiers for purely military advice" and urges politicians to study and understand war: "Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decision influence operations for the worse. In the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statesman often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy." Clausewitz synthesizes his view of war and policy as a coherent, integrated continuum. While soldiers clearly must be subordinate to politicians, they are not passive servants: They have an active responsibility to ensure that their political masters understand the full (i.e., military AND political) implications of their decisions.
(Sources: Peter Paret, "Clausewitz and Ilana Kass, NWC Teaching Points)
  1. What is War?
    I propose to consider first the various elements of the subject, next it various parts or sections, and
    finally the whole in its internal structure. In other words, I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.

    I shall not begin by expounding a pedantic, literary definition of war, but go straight tot he heart of the matter, to the duel. War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance.

    War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.

    The thesis, then, must be repeated: war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first "extreme" we meet with.

    NapoleonWar never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously. Each side can therefore gauge the other to a large extent by what he is and does, instead of judging him by what he, strictly speaking, ought to be or do. Man and his affairs, however, are always something short of perfect and will never quite achieve the absolute best. Such shortcomings affect both sides alike and therefore constitute a moderating force.

    If it is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the less you need make yourself. Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must. This is another reason why your effort will be modified.

    The political object--the original motive for the war--will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement.

    Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. This brings us to a different question, which now needs to be analyzed and answered.

    Such is war, such is the commander who directs it, and such the theory that governs it. War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts.     It is a serious means to a serious end, and ... resemblance to a game of chance, all the vicissitudes of passion, courage, imagination, and enthusiasm it includes are merely its special characteristics.

    When whole communities go to war--whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples--the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy. Were it complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting.

    Chinese_clausewitzWe see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

    First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them.

    The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make it to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive...It is enough, for the moment, to have reached this stage and to have established the cardinal point of view from which war and the theory of war have to be examined.

    War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit it is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
    The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

    ...Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.
  2. Purpose and Means in War
    we can now see that in war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent's outright defeat. They range from the destruction o the enemy's forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks.

    What has been said about plans and forces being directed to other uses refers only to the positive purposes, other than the destruction of enemy forces, that can be pursued in war. It pertains in no way to pure resistance, which seeks to wear down the opponent's strength. Pure resistance has no positive intention; we can use our forces only to frustrate the enemy's intentions, and not divert them to other objectives.

    Here we must consider the negative side of destroying the enemy's forces--that is, the preservation of our own. These two efforts always go together; they interact. They are integral parts of a single purpose, and we only need to consider the result if one or the other dominates. The effort to destroy the enemy's forces has a positive purpose and leads to positive results, whose final aim is the enemy's collapse. Preserving our own forces has a negative purpose; it frustrates the enemy's intentions--that is, it amounts to pure resistance, whose ultimate aim can only be to prolong the war until the enemy is exhausted.
  3. Gustavus_adolphus_at_the_battle_at_breitOn Military Genius
    If we pursue the demands that war makes on those who practice it, we come to the region dominated by the powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are ,b>wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A ,b>sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.

    Since all information and assumptions are open to doubt, and with chance at work everywhere, the commander continually finds that things are not as he expected. This is bound to influence his plans, or at least the assumptions underlying them. If this influence is sufficiently powerful to cause a change in his plans, he must usually work out new ones; but for these the necessary information may not be immediately available. During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once; they merely trickle in. They continually impinge on our decisions, and our mind must be permanently armed, so to speak, to deal with them. If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d'oeil; the second is determination.

    Coup d'oeil therefore refers not alone to the physical but, more commonly, to the inward eye. The expression, like the quality itself, has certainly always been more applicable to tactics, but it must also have its place in strategy, since here as well quick decisions are often needed.

    Four elements make up the climate of war: danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance. If we consider them together, it becomes evident how fortitude of mind and character are needed to made progress in these impeding elements with safety and success. According to circumstance, reporters and historians of war use such terms as energy, firmness, staunchness, emotional balance, and strength of character. These products of a heroic nature could almost be treated as one and the same force--strength of will--which adjusts itself to circumstances: but though closely linked, they are not identical. A closer study of the interplay of psychological forces at work here my be worthwhile.

    To bring a war, or one of its campaigns, to a successful close requires a thorough grasp of national policy. On that level strategy and policy coalesce: the commander-in-chief is simultaneously a statesman.
  4. Angle_1On Danger in War
    Let us accompany a novice to the battlefield. As we approach the rumble of guns grows louder and alternates with the whir of cannonballs, which begin to attract his attention. Shots begin to strike close around us. We hurry up the slope where the commanding general is stationed with his large staff. Here cannonballs and bursting shells are frequent, and life begins to seem more serious than the young man had imagined. Suddenly someone you know is wounded; then a shell falls among the staff. You notice that some of the officers act a little oddly; you yourself are not as steady and collected as you were; even the bravest can become slightly distracted. Now we enter the battle raging before us, still almost like a spectacle, and join the nearest divisional commander. Shot is falling like hail, and the thunder of our own guns adds to the din. Forward to the brigadier, a soldier of acknowledged bravery, but he is careful to take cover behind a rise, a house or a clump of trees. A noise is heard that this a certain indication of increasing danger--the rattling of grapeshot on roofs on the ground. Cannonballs tear past, whizzing in all directions, and musketballs begin to whistle around us. A little further we reach the firing line, where the infantry endures the hammering for hours with incredible steadfastness. The air is filled with hissing bullets that sound like a sharp crack if they pass close to one's head. For a final shock, the sight of men being killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity.
  5. On Physical Effort in War
  6. Intelligence in War
    By "intelligence" we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country--the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations. If we consider the actual basis of this information, how unreliable and transient it is, we soon realize that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins.

    In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies. As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good, and rather tend to exaggerate bad news. The dangers that are reported may soon, like waves, subside; but like waves they keep recurring, without apparent reason. The commander must trust his judgment and stand like a rock on which the waves break in vain....
  7. Friction in War
    If one has never personally experienced war, one cannot understand in what the difficulties constantly mentioned really consist, nor why a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability. Everything looks simple; the knowledge required does not look remarkable, the strategic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is still extremely hard to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective.

    Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.
  8. CivilwarConcluding Observations in Book One
    In their restrictive effects they can be grouped into a single concept of general friction. Is there any lubricant that will reduce this abrasion? Only one, and a commander and his army will not always have it readily available: combat experience.

    Habit hardens the body for great exertions, strengthens the heart in great peril, and fortifies judgment against first impressions. Habit breeds that priceless quality, calm, which, passing from hussar and rifleman up to the general himself, will lighten the commander's task

Book Two: "On the Theory of War"

  1. Classification of the Art of War
  2. France_at_warOn the Theory of War.
    Combat gives rise to the element of danger in which all military activity must move and be maintained like birds in air and fish in water. The effects of danger, however, produce an emotional reaction, either as a matter of immediate instinct, or consciously. The former results in an effort to avoid the danger, or, where that is not possible, in fear and anxiety. Where these effects do not arise, it is because instinct has been outweighed by courage. But courage is by no means a conscious act; like fear, it is an emotion. Fear is concerned with physical and courage with moral survival. Courage is the nobler instinct, and as such cannot be treated as an inanimate instrument that functions simply as prescribed. So courage is not simply a counterweight to danger, to be used for neutralizing its effects: it is a quality on its own.

    A specialist who has spent half his life trying to master every aspect of some obscure subject is surely more likely to make headway than a man who is trying to master it in a short time. Theory exists so that one need not start start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.

    Knowledge must be so absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way.... It is never like that in war. Continual change and the need to respond to it compels the commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his knowledge within him. He must always be ready to bring forth the appropriate decision. By total assimilation with his mind and life, the commander's knowledge must be transformed into a genuine capability.... In the field of strategy, therefore, even more than in tactics, theory will be content with the simple consideration of material and psychological factors, especially where it embraces the highest of achievements. It will be sufficient if it helps the commander acquire those insights that, once absorbed into his way of thinking, will smooth and protect his progress, and will never force him to abandon his convictions for the sake of any objective fact.
  3. Art of War or Science of WarVom_kriege
  4. Method and Routine
  5. Critical Analysis
  6. On Historical Examples

    "Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. . . . The aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it."

    "Results are of two kinds: direct and indirect. . . . The possession of provinces, cities, fortresses, roads, bridges, munitions dumps, etc., may be the immediate object of an engagement, but can never be the final one."

    "If we do not learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of value in themselves, we are liable to regard them as windfall profits."

    "The strategic elements that affect the use of engagements may be classified into various types: moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical."

    "An army that maintains its cohesion. . . that cannot be shaken by fears . . ; [that] will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers . . ; [that] has been steeled by training in privation and effort; . . that is mindful of the honor of its arms -- such an army is imbued with the true military spirit."

    "There are only two sources for this spirit. . . . The first is a series of victorious wars; the second, frequent exertions of the army to the utmost limits of its strength."

    "In what field of human activity is boldness more at home than in war? . . . It must be granted a certain power over and above successful calculations involving space, time, and magnitude of forces."

    "In war more than anywhere else things do not turn out as we expect. . . . Perseverance in the chosen course is the essential counterweight."

    "Cunning implies secret purpose. . . . It is itself a form of deceit. . . . No human characteristic appears so suited to the task of directing and inspiring strategy. . . . [Yet] the fact remains that these qualities do not figure prominently in the history of war."

    "Superiority of numbers is the most common element in victory. . . . Superiority . . . can obviously reach the point where it is overwhelming. . . . It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point.

    "The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point. . . . There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated."

Book Three: On Strategy in General

Prussia_1Includes not only chapters on force, time, and space, but also a more detailed treatment of psychological elements--all, according to Clausewitz, "the operative elements of war." (Source: Peter Paret, Clausewitz)
  1. Strategy
  2. Elements of Strategy
  3. Moral Factors
  4. The Principal Moral Elements
  5. Military Virtues of the Army
  6. Boldness
  7. Perseverence
  8. Superiority of Numbers
  9. Surprise
  10. Cunning
  11. Concentration of Forces in Space
  12. Unification of Forces in Time
  13. The Strategic Reserve
  14. Economy of Force
  15. The Geometric Factor
  16. The Suspension of Action in War
  17. The Character of Contemporary Warfare
  18. Tension and Rest

Book Four: The Engagement

De_la_guerre
  1. Introduction
  2. The Nature of the Battle Today
  3. The Engagement in General and Continued
  4. The Significance of the Engagement
  5. Duration of the Engagement
  6. Decision of the Engagement
  7. Mutual Agreement to Fight
  8. The Battle: Its Decision
  9. The Battle: The Effects of Victory
  10. The Battle: The Use of Battle
  11. Strategic Means of Exploiting Victory
  12. Retreat after a Lost Battle
  13. Night Operations

Book Five: Military Forces

Clausewitz_on_war
  1. General Survey
  2. The Army, the Theater of Operations, the Campaign
  3. Relative Strength
  4. Relationship between the Branches of the Service
  5. The Army's Order of Battle
  6. General Disposition of the Army
  7. Advance Guard and Outposts
  8. Operational Use of Advanced Corps
  9. Camps
  10. Marches...
  11. Billets
  12. Maintenance and Supply
  13. Base of Operations
  14. Lines of Communication
  15. Terrain
  16. The Command of Heights

Book Six: Defense

Clausewitz1Clausewitz says defense is the stronger form of warfare, as long as all you're trying to do is to keep what you've got. Defense (like deterrence) cedes the initiative to the opponent. Therefore, it is a strategy of "a negative aim." Note that "negative" here is NOT a value judgement (as in "bad") but, rather, a restatement of the reality that by merely defending you don't gain anything tangible (like terrain), but you might gain time. The attacker has the weaker form of war but the positive goal--i.e., to increase his power by seizing assets (e.g., land, population, political prestige).

Source: Ilana Kass, Teaching Clausewitz
  1. Attack and Defense

    But if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows; and these offensive acts in a defensive war come under the heading of "defense"--in other words, our offensive takes place within our own positions or theater of operations. Thus, a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles, and in a defensive battle, we can employ our divisions offensively. Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take the offensive. So the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.

    What is the object of defense? Preservation. It is easier to hold ground than take it. It follows that defense is easier than attack, assuming both sides have equal means. Just what is it that makes preservation and protection so much easier? It is the fact that time which is allowed to pass unused accumulates to the credit of the defender. He reaps where he did not sow. Any omission of attack--whether from bad judgment, fear, or indolence--accrues to the defender's benefit.

    ...But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest. The latter increases one's own capacity to wage war; the former does not. So in order to state the relationship precisely, we must say that the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive. ...If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object.

    ...defense is the stronger form of waging war.
  2. The Relationship between Attack and Defense in TacticsOn_war_in_arabic
  3. The Relationship between Attack and Defense in Strategy
  4. Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defense
  5. The Character of Attack and Divergence of Defense
  6. The Character of Strategic Defense
  7. Scope of the Means of Defense
  8. Interaction between Attack and Defense
  9. Types of Resistance
  10. The Defensive Battle
  11. Fortresses
  12. Defensive Positions
  13. Fortified Positions and Entrenched Camps
  14. Flank Positions
  15. Defensive Mountain Warfare...
  16. Defense of Rivers and Streams...
  17. A. A Defense of Swamps
    B. Indundation
  18. Defense of Forests
  19. The Cordon
  20. The Key to the Country
  21. Operations on a Flank
  22. Retreat to the Interior of the Country
  23. The People in Arms
  24. Defense of a Theater of Operations...Phased Resistance...Where a Decision is Not the Objective

Book Seven: The Attack

Japanese_clausewitz
  1. 1. Attack in Relation to Defense

    Although the concept of defense is parrying a blow and its characteristic feature is awaiting the blow, "if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows. . . . Thus a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles. . . "The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows."

    The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, defense is easier than attack. "But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest. . . . If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, if follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object."

    Defense is the stronger form of waging war.
  2. The Nature of Strategic Attack
  3. The Object of the Strategic Attack
  4. The Diminishing Force of the Attack
  5. The Culmination Point of the Attack
  6. Destruction of the Enemy's Forces
  7. The Offensive Battle
  8. River Crossing
  9. Attack on Defensive Positions
  10. Attack on Entrenched Camps
  11. Attack on a Mountainous Area
  12. Attack on Cordons
  13. Maneuver
  14. Attacks on Swamps, Flooded Areas, and Forests
  15. Attack on a Theater of War: Seeking a Decision
  16. Attack on a Theater of War: Not Seeking a Decision
  17. Attack on Fortresses
  18. Attack on Convoys
  19. Attack on an Enemy Army in Billets
  20. Diversions
  21. Invasion
  22. The Culminating Point of Victory

Book Eight: War Plans

Takes up the three most important themes of the first book, explores the relationship between "absolute" war in theory and real war, and in a sweep of theoretical and historic essays of great originality analyzes the political character of war and the interaction of politics and strategy. (Source: Peter Paret, Clausewitz)
  1. Introduction
  2. Artois_afterattackAbsolute War and Real War
    War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war--or rather no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.
  3. A. Interdependence of the Elements of War
    B. Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be Made
  4. Closer Definition of the Military Objective: The Defeat of the Enemy: Centers of gravity is one of the most controversial in On War. There are many interpretations and many useful ways to approach it, and Clausewitz uses the term in several different ways and at both the operational and the strategic levels. In essence, however, COGs comprise the dominant characteristics of both belligerents. They are sources of power, not weakness--though it is of course our job to somehow turn the enemy's COG into a weakness or to deprive him of its benefits. Note that Clausewitz advises to narrow one's focus to as few centers of gravity as possible--one if feasible--and concentrate all efforts on it. Note also that he gives a menu of different possible centers of gravity. A discussion of these criteria and the difference between a center of gravity and a target is important. Targets are tactical; CoG are strategic because the aim is to kill--kinetically or otherwise --that element in the enemy's system "on which everything depends"--be it his military, his national/social/economic leadership center, or his alliance.

    (Source: Ilana Kass, Teaching Clausewitz)
  5. Closer Definition of the Military Objective: Limited Aims
  6. A. The Effect of the Political Aim on the Military Objective
    B. War is an Instrument of Policy

    Heavy_artilleryIn short, at the highest level the art of war turns into policy--but a policy conducted by fighting battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes. We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice. But it makes even less sense for thoreticians to assert that all available military resources should be put at the disposal of the commander so that on their basis he can draw up purely military plans for a war or a campaign.

    Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse. In the same way as a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.
  7. The Limited Aim: Offensive War
  8. The Limited Aim: Defensive War
  9. The Plan of a War designed to Lead to the Total Defeat of the EnemyCenters of gravity. This term is one of the most controversial in On War. There are many interpretations and many useful ways to approach it, and Clausewitz uses the term in several different ways and at both the operational and the strategic levels. In essence, however, COGs comprise the dominant characteristics of both belligerents. They are sources of power, not weakness--though it is of course our job to somehow turn the enemy's COG into a weakness or to deprive him of its benefits. Note that Clausewitz advises to narrow one's focus to as few centers of gravity as possible--one if feasible--and concentrate all efforts on it. Note also that he gives a menu of different possible centers of gravity. A discussion of these criteria and the difference between a center of gravity and a target is important. Targets are tactical; CoG are strategic because the aim is to kill--kinetically or otherwise --that element in the enemy's system "on which everything depends"--be it his military, his national/social/economic leadership center, or his alliance.

A Personal Note from Clausewitz...

Clausewitz2Most men merely act on instinct, and the amount of success they achieve depends on the amount of talent they were born with.
All great commanders have acted on instinct, and the fact that their instinct was always sound is partly the measure of their innate greatness and genius. So far as action is concerned this will always be the case and nothing more is needed. Yet when it is not a question of acting oneself but of persuading others in discussion, the need is for clear ideas and the ability to show their connection with each other. So few people have yet acquired the necessary skill at this that most discussions a re a futile bandying of words; one agreeing, for the sake of agreement, on a compromise with nothing to be said for it.
Clear ideas on these matters do, therefore, have some practical value.

What is the Trinity? And What isn't it?

Source: Ilana Kass

Clausewitz's Trinity is NOT people/government/army. This is a common mistake for students of CVC. Instead, here is what the Trinity consists of:

a. Violence, hatred and enmity (i.e, violent, essentially irrational emotion)
b. Chance/probability and creativity
c. Reason (i.e., rational, intelligent analysis and decision).

Some Great Clausewitzian Links

The Clausewitz Homepage
This website on Clausewitz is a great place for anyone to start their study of Carl von Clausewitz...extremely informative, useful and interesting!
Wikipedia
An excellent quick overview of Clausewitz as a launching point or a refresher!
Project Gutenberg :: Volume I of On War
On War - Volume 1 by Carl von Clausewitz
Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America
Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Teaching Clausewitz
Faculty teaching guidance provided to instructors at the National War College, located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington DC, in teaching Clausewitz during Course 5602, "Military Thought and the Essence of War," during academic year 2003-04. It is primarily the work of NWC Professor Ilana Kass (a professor at the National War College since 1985).

Clausewitz the CEO...

"Von Clausewitz summed up what it had all been about in his classic On War. Men could not reduce strategy to a formula. Detailed planning necessarily failed, due to the inevitable frictions encountered: chance events, imperfections in execution, and the independent will of the opposition. Instead, the human elements were paramount: leadership, morale, and the almost instinctive savvy of the best generals.
"The Prussian general staff, under the elder von Moltke, perfected these concepts in practice. They did not expect a plan of operations to survive beyond the first contact with the enemy. They set only the broadest of objectives and emphasised seizing unforeseen opportunities as they arose. Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances."

Jack Welch

New Guestbook

submit
Show All

Did You Enjoy This Lens?

If you enjoyed this summary of Carl von Clausewitz and On War, please rate this lens at the top of the page by clicking the stars! Many Thanks and Best Wishes, John

The Great "Clauz" on Amazon

Loading

Great Clauzewitzian Buys on eBay

Loading

Clausewitzian Accessories from Cafe Press

10-inch Clausewitz Wall Clock

10-inch Clausewitz Wall Clock

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

Mug of Wisdom #1

Mug of Wisdom #1

From: CafePress.com Online Store

Buy Now

Coffee mug.

Coffee mug.

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

CLAUSEWITZ T-Shirt (White)

CLAUSEWITZ T-Shirt (White)

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

Clausewitz Mousepad

Clausewitz Mousepad

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

CLAUSEWITZ T-Shirt (White)

CLAUSEWITZ T-Shirt (White)

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

Large Clausewitz Poster (23x35)

Large Clausewitz Poster (23x35)

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

Clausewitz.com Beer Stein

Clausewitz.com Beer Stein

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

Large Clausewitz.com Coffee Mug

Large Clausewitz.com Coffee Mug

From: Clausewitz.com Image Shop

Buy Now

See more designs like these on CafePress
Powered by CafePress

The Clausewitz Plexo!

5

Vote Up
Vote Down
Make Money Taking Surveys

Make Money Taking Surveys

Discover How to Make as Much Money as You Want, Just more...1 point

11

Vote Up
Vote Down
Jomini, Clausewitz, and Schlieffen, History Issued By West Point Military Academy

Jomini, Clausewitz, and Schlieffen, History Issued By West Point Military Academy

Presumed First Edition issued by Department of Mil more...0 points

by

John_Fenzel

John Fenzel is the author of the novel, The Lazarus Covenant.  Learn more at: www.JohnFenzel.com
View John's Blog at:   http://johnfenzel.typepad.com/ more »

Feeling creative? Create a Lens!

Explore related pages

Related Tags