Vietnam: We Could Have Won

AN ALTERNATE STRATEGY MODEL 

In retrospect, were our mistakes in Vietnam preventable had we applied a different strategy at the outset? Authors like Gaddis Smith, John Prados, and Eric Bergerud have submitted indistinguishable, captious "no-win" scenarios; others who have answered "yes," have arrived at widely divergent winning strategies focusing almost solely either on the conventional war (as Harry Summers did in his book, On Strategy), or the insurgency in South Vietnam (as Andrew Krepinevich does with The Army and Vietnam). However elegant and influential their analyses, each of these authors erred at the beginning by failing to properly assess the true nature of the war. Of all the definitions, General Palmer's "devilish mixture" assessment of the Vietnam War remains perhaps the most salient and accurate. Through the lens of General Palmer's trenchant definition, it is clear that an alternate strategy addressing both the conventional and unconventional nature of the war in Vietnam could have been developed and would have favorably influenced the war's outcome.

With the benefit of hindsight, then, we can consider one strategy that could have been applied in three principal phases:

• Phase I. The first phase would strengthen the Vietnamese Armed Forces (VNAF) through tailored advisory and material support, thus obviating the need for large- scale Vietnamization at a later date. A second strategic imperative of this phase would prevent NVA infiltration to the South using combined VNAF-MNF strategic defensive operations along the DMZ and the Laotian-Cambodian borders. Finally, reversing the VC/PAVN insurgency in the South would be accomplished through self-sustaining GVN-U.S. "Clear and Hold" operations and Demographic Frontier Programs-- the centerpiece of a Limited Shield/Pacification strategy.
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• Expanding South Vietnam's enclaves through an enhanced CORDS program in conjunction with the CIDG and CAP programs in the Hamlets would transform the Vietnamese populace from a critical vulnerability to an inherent strength for the GVN. Replacing our "Search and Destroy" tactics with the "Clear and Hold" operations long advocated by General Victor Krulak would sustain the emphasis on applying force economically and in a concentrated fashion to protect, rather than to disrupt, Vietnamese hamlets.
  
  Yet another step would involve providing a "limited shield" between South Vietnam and North Vietnam, as well as along known infiltration routes from neighboring Laos and Cambodia. This "shield" would have consisted of a combined, integrated SVAF-MNF force, concentrated along the DMZ, and "extended into Laos across the narrow waist of the panhandle region." Drawing upon the Demographic Frontier Strategy described by Andrew Krepinevich,
  
  
  Special Forces units would [be] used as strike teams just beyond the frontier, detecting any attempts by the enemy to concentrate his forces for an attack on the populated region. Sufficient main force units would [be] kept in reserve to blunt any enemy attempt to launch a major conventional assault against the pacification program.
  
  The MNF force in Laos, would necessarily be composed of non-combatant (UN security) forces, ostensibly emplaced to enforce the neutrality treaty signed by North Vietnam and Laos.
• Phase II. In an effort to isolate North Vietnam politically, Hanoi's alliance system could be "attacked" with an accelerated U.S. diplomatic strategy aimed at securing Detente with Russia and China. Once the Vietnamese Armed Forces were sufficiently invigorated, reasonably capable of conducting their own internal defense, and the GVN was clearly able to negotiate from a minimum position of parity, the GVN would negotiate with Hanoi for an end to hostilities. With its alliance system already severely weakened, Hanoi would be presented with the costly alternative of an expanded war on its own soil.
  
  Assuming enhanced public support for the war under these conditions, a compelling case can be made that the combined application of Vietnamization, pacification and negotiation with North Vietnam-properly coordinated and balanced-would have been the best strategy then available to meet American objectives at an acceptable cost.
• Phase III. In the event Phase II negotiations failed or were abrogated by Hanoi, a limited strategic offensive would have been executed by the Multinational Force (MNF) to compel a viable peace settlement. This phase would involve: a combined MNF limited ground offensive into North Vietnam to the Twentieth Parallel; mining North Vietnam's harbors; and an extended strategic supply/force interdiction (LINEBACKER/SEALORDS) campaign supported by ARVN forces on the ground. A second attempt to negotiate with Hanoi would then be made from an unassailable position of strength.
  
  In a concerted effort to achieve surprise and shock value against Hanoi, a limited ground, air and naval offensive would apply massed strength at decisive points. The ground offensive would be a limited but aggressive one, stopping its advance at the 20th Parallel, short of Hanoi, and aiming to liberate all known POW camps in the North. Although the political risks of such a strategy are manifest, the overriding danger of strategic miscalculation would be dramatically diminished when combined with the U.S. policy of Detente with the Chinese and Soviets pursued by Nixon and Kissinger. The multinational composition of a forces arrayed along North Vietnam's southern border into Laos would also lend political legitimacy to this strategy.
  
  A variety of other risks relating to public support of the war accompany this strategy. Of course, the risk of sustaining heavy casualties with a limited ground/amphibious offensive would be a political and military consideration to be assessed and mitigated against. Such an invasion would represent an escalation of the war that the American public and international community may or may not support, given the risks and the ultimate cost in lives. It is assumed, however, support for the war would not have degraded to the extent it had, if Phase I of this strategy were executed successfully. The value of a limited offensive, moreover, explained in the context of ending the war on our terms, would likely attract support and significantly boost morale. While it is possible that Hanoi could retain the will to continue the war, such a decision seems unlikely once it found its alliance structure shattered and saw its national survival threatened; and particularly when, as an alternative, Hanoi's leadership could choose to settle for the status quo ante.
  
  
  Of course, no one can say with any certainty that an alternate strategy, however well-devised, could have succeeded in Vietnam. Faced with an adversary that refused to fight on our own terms, the war ground to a stalemate. Ultimately, Hanoi's strategy of protraction prevailed when the war was no longer palatable to the American people and we were left with no choice but to withdraw. A host of military, political and "environmental" factors exposed both the inherent weaknesses of our strategy and the superiority of our adversary's strategy.
  
  In hindsight, it was perhaps our failure to reassess our strategy, and to realize that Hanoi's strength was a mirror image of own critical vulnerabilities that caused our defeat. In order to attack North Vietnam's strategy effectively, we would have been compelled to strengthen the collective U.S./Vietnamese will and capability to fight a protracted unconventional war. Our failure represented a total collapse of the classic Clausewitzian Trinity, yet it seems the overriding factor was South Vietnam's dependency upon our presence to survive. The Johnson Administration's critical failure represented a series of critical omissions forced upon South Vietnam, but it is also evident that the United States plunged headlong into the morass by eliminating the possibility of South Vietnam playing a primary role in its own defense.
• n retrospect, we would have done well to heed the advice of Sir Thomas Lawrence (of Arabia):
  
  "Better they do it imperfectly than you do it perfectly; for it is their country, their war, and your time is limited."
  
  

Discussion Questions on the Vietnam War 

Source: SparkNotes

• 1. Did the United States win or lose the Vietnam War? Justify your answer.
  2. How did U.S. objectives differ from the objectives of Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists during the war?
  3. Compare and contrast Johnson's and Nixon's respective Vietnam War strategies.
  4. Discuss the impact of antiwar protest movements in the United States during the Vietnam War.
  5. How did U.S. foreign policy evolve from the end of World War II in 1945 to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975?